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The thesis traces the diplomatic history of U. S.-
Yugoslav relations from the first United States interest in
the Tito-Mihailovic crisis during World War II, until the
United States agreed to contribute economic aid to Yugo-
slavia in 1949. The periods covered include the gradual
movement of Yugoslavia from British sphere to American
sphere through American involvement in the Tito-Subasi6
Agreement, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration, and the Yalta agreements.
Following the end of World War II, diplomatic rela-
tions cooled because of the Mihailovic and Stepinac trials,
the loss of two American aircraft over Yugoslavia, and the
Trieste clashes.
When Tito broke with the Cominform in 1948, the
United States, it is proposed, developed a sound and last-
ing policy of assistance toward Yugoslavia that continues
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The continued existence of a communist government in
Yugoslavia, a government that has declared for nonalignment,
is a contemporary political phenomenon. That this government
has existed for almost twenty years independently of Moscow
is due to one man, Josip Broz-Tito. That Tito could main-
tain his declared independence of the Kremlin is due to the
United States and the farsighted actions of those men who
shape the foreign policy of the United States.
The United States had little interest in Yugoslavia
prior to World War II. Since that time, the establishment
of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion, the U. S. military aid and advisers who assisted the
Yugoslav insurgents, and the inability of Great Britain to
maintain her traditional influence in the Balkans all
attracted the United States to a more aggressive policy in
Yugoslavia. Following the war, Yugoslavia became the symbol
of American frustration in Europe, the confrontation with
Soviet-propelled communism. Despite these problems, the
Department of State always managed to treat Tito and Yugo-
slavia with a little more care and understanding than the
other communist nations. When Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union fell out in 1948, the officials in the Department of
State were quick to grasp the full implications and to
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develop a new policy that has been both enlightening in its
reversal of previous American attitudes toward communism
and successful in its attempt at stabilizing Yugoslavia's
national independence—free of Soviet domination.
The United States policy toward Yugoslavia has been
little publicized, poorly understood, and badly berated by
Congress. And yet it stands as the most successful foreign
policy that the United States has followed since communism
began its spectacular rise. In this thesis, then, the
writer has tried to shed some light on how the United States
became interested in Yugoslavia, and why the American offi-
cials were so eager to aid Yugoslavia on Yugoslavia's terms.
The pursuit of factual information has been limited
because the State Department files for the period covered
in this thesis are not yet unclassified. According to the
Department of State, these files might not be unclassified
until well into the 1970 's. Still there is enough informa-
tion available in The New York Times and in the State
Department's own publications to provide the factual infor-
mation needed to construct this thesis. This author's
research has revealed that there has never been any signifi-
cant research done on this particular topic, and even the
many memoirs of American statesmen mention the events of
United States-Yugoslav relations only in passing.
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Yugoslav proper names have received the proper
spelling and marking in the body of the paper. The Angli-
cized versions sometimes appear in quotes and footnotes,
e.g., Fotic—Fotitch, Mihailovic—Mihailovitch.
The writer would especially like to thank Mr. Harold
Vedeler, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Eastern
European Affairs , whose advice and counsel were invaluable
in completing this study.

CHAPTER I
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES INVOLVED
IN YUGOSLAV POLITICS
As World War II entered its last years in 1944, one
of the more perplexing political problems facing both Great
Britain and the United States was the reinstatement of pro-
Western governments-in-exile in their liberated homeland,
and their support or lack of support by the indigenous
population.
In the case of Yugoslavia, both the British and the
American governments had given full recognition to the
Royal Yugoslav Government, represented in London by King
Peter II and many of his former ministers. However, the
effective governing force of Yugoslavia was one of the two
resistance groups still fighting in Yugoslavia: the
Partisans, led by Josip Broz—more commonly known as Tito.
Because the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill,
reached the conclusion that Tito's Partisans were perform-
ing far more effectively against the German occupation
forces than the other resistance unit, the Cetnici, led by
The name used by Serb forefathers in their under-
ground battles against the Turks. The Serbian word Seta
means "company."

General Draza Mihailovic (and favored by the Royal Yugoslav
Government-in-exile), he attempted to arrange a close col-
laboration between Tito and the exile government. The
greatest stumbling block to this collaboration was that, in
November of 1943 at Jajce, Tito had set up a provisional
government, claiming sole authority in Yugoslavia and depriv-
ing the Royal Yugoslav Government of all its rights. It was
at this same meeting of the Anti-fascist Council of National
Liberation (AVNOJ) that Tito was declared Marshal of Yugo-
slavia,
Mr. Churchill felt strongly that: "No irrevocable
political decisions about the future regime in Yugoslavia
should be made in the atmosphere of occupation, civil war,
and 'emigre' politics." The Prime Minister was disturbed
not only by the internal bickering of the various ethnic
groups within the Royal Yugoslav Government in London but
even more by the civil war within a war raging in Yugoslavia
itself. The Partisans and the Cetnici were spending more
time fighting against each other than against the German
and Italian forces, and at the cost of thousands of Yugo-
slav lives. Although the Royal Yugoslav Government feud
might be seen as a petty preoccupation with traditional
Serb-Croat rivalries, the Partisan-Cetnici battles were a
direct hindrance to the ultimate Allied military

objective: destruction of the Axis armies on every pos-
2
sible front.
It was Churchill's decision even as early as the end
of 1943 to provide all-out military support to Tito's Par-
tisans as the force who most effectively detained the
3
estimated twenty Axis divisions in the Balkans. The
reason for his choice of Tito over Mihailovic can best be
seen in Churchill's military opinion of the two forces.
Under the pressure of shocking Nazi reprisals for guer-
rilla activities:
Mihailovic drifted gradually into a posture where
some of his commanders made accommodations with
the German and Italian troops to be left alone in
certain mountain areas in return for doing little
or nothing against the enemy.
On the other hand, Churchill estimated that Tito's Parti-
sans "had little to lose but their lives"; and retaliation
was not a weapon the Germans could effectively use against
4
such a force. As reconciliation between Tito and
Mihailovic seemed hopeless, Churchill wanted to have the
2Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1953), Vol. V, "Closing the Ring," p. 467.
3Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York
The MacMillan Company, 1951), p. 29.
4Churchill, op. cit
. ,
p. 462. This decision of
Churchill's was partially supported by Roosevelt and Stalin
at Teheran and became the first part of that conference's
military conclusions, ibid
. , p. 404.

4most effective government in power and to withdraw support
from the other.
Mr. Churchill's chief aim, then, had to be to reconcile
the two governments—one within and one without the country
—
and their respective policies. His decision was to withdraw
official support from Mihailovi6 and recall the British
5
missions operating in Mihailovic's territory. These ac-
tions were necessary in the face of the estimate provided the
Prime Minister by the British Ambassador to the Royal Yugo-
slav Government, Sir Ralph Stevenson:
The partisans will be the rulers of Yugoslavia.
They are of such value to us militarily that we
must back them to the full, subordinating political
considerations to military. It is extremely doubt-
ful whether we can any longer regard the Monarchy
as a unifying element in Yugoslavia.
6
At the time, the strong British attitudes met with
mixed reactions in Washington. Great Britain, by United
States diplomatic consent, had been playing the major
great-power role in the Balkans. The main reason for this
was a verbal agreement between Prime Minister Churchill and
President Roosevelt, made at the Casablanca meeting in
1943, that the British would agree to the "unconditional
surrender" announcement only if they in turn received com-








5diplomatic policy in the Middle East and the Balkans. Al-
though this was acceptable to Roosevelt, he neglected to
inform his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, of this matter.
7
The Secretary found out quite some time later by accident.
The Casablanca agreement did not coincide with most
of the varied opinions within official Washington circles,
perhaps because American political and military objectives
were not as closely aligned at this time as were those of
the British.
The consensus at the Department of State was for a
more moderate stand, as can be seen in a memorandum sent to
the British Embassy by Mr. Edward R. Stettinius , Jr.:
This Government ... has favored the extension of
military aid to those resistance forces actively
engaged against the Germans, without political dis-
tinction, and has avoided giving political support
to either the nationalists or the Partisans. 8
Another problem that faced the United States,
according to Mr. H. F. Armstrong, a wartime special adviser
to Secretary of State Hull, was that the complexities and
obscurities of the Yugoslav situation for the United States
were further confused by the ambiguity of the information
7The New York Times , December 17, 1944, p. 4.
q
U. S. Department of State, The Conferences at Malta
and Yalta
, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing OfTice,
1955), p. 257. Hereafter referred to as Yalta Conference.

6and policy-making roles of the Office of Strategic Services
(O.S.S.) in relation to those of the Department of State:
It is easy to see that functions of information and
policy-making which in a large measure had to be
improvised in a great emergency, and which never
were satisfactorily correlated, could become con-
fused in dealing with the situation in Yugoslavia,
where confusion was the keynote. Tito's reputation
improved in the foreign as well as the domestic
confusion, especially among those who, knowing or
caring little about the past, fixed their eyes on
current estimates of the military situation and felt
that the political future must take care of itself .9
As far as the Pentagon was concerned, the military objec-
tives, as seen by Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, were
riveted in Western Europe, and did not allow for Churchill's
plea for an attack on the "soft underbelly of Europe" in
support of Tito. This objective was in direct contradic-
tion to the Casablanca agreement, but Roosevelt obviously
did nothing to counter his military advisers on the matter.
By June 1944, King Peter II had appointed Dr. Ivan
Subasic, the former Ban (governor) of Croatia, and at the
time a resident of the United States, as Premier. It was
the intention of the Royal Yugoslav Government, at the
urging of the British, to reach an agreement with the
Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation toward a united
government. Winston Churchill wanted again to assure Tito
that Mihailovic was out of favor and a more flexible
9Armstrong, op_. cit . t p. 20

710 X wpolitical leadership was now available. Tito and subasic
met that same month and began negotiations toward concluding
an agreement. The final agreement was signed in late fall.
The British concurred in this agreement; the U. S.
Department of State was less than enthusiastic:
The Tito-Subasic agreement, now awaiting the King»s
approval in London, would transfer the effective
powers of government to the Tito organization, with
just enough participation of the Government in exile
to facilitate recognition by other governments. 11
In later years, the agreement was characterized by the U. S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary as "a complete surrender
to Tito."12
The New York Times , in December, 1944, presented a
very succinct estimate of the United States position vis-3-
vis the Balkans, an accurate appraisal of the U. S. success
in Yugoslavia up to that time:
The late American military and especially diplo-
matic policy in the Balkans, by adhering to the
Casablanca agreement became to all intents and
purposes a zero. Several important American diplo-
mats and other officials tried to interest the
White House in taking a more active role in the
10Churchill, op_. cit
. , pp. 477-478.
Yalta Conference , op . cit., p. 262.
12United States Congress, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Yugoslav Communism : A Critical Study (ed.
Charles Zalarj Washington: Government Printing Office,
1961), p. 109. This report also carries the language of
the agreement, pp. 108-9.

8Balkans because of America's moral interests in
her small Allies, Greece and Yugoslavia, as well
as her eventual, although seemingly distant
potential direct interests. These all failed.^- 3
About this same time, increasing concern began
sweeping through the Department of State over what was felt
to be the British singlemindedness toward the military ad-
vantages accruing in Yugoslavia, The British, in their
turn, discovered that the Americans were becoming more
involved in the ultimate political solution of Yugoslavia,
just as they gradually became so involved in all of Europe,
Knowing that President Roosevelt would soon be meet-
ing with Churchill and Stalin in an historic conference,
the Department of State felt it necessary to put in writing
their views as to the overall U, S. attitudes toward the
Balkans, In a briefing book paper, called "Reconstruction
of Poland and the Balkans: American Interests and Soviet
Attitudes," the following opinions were expressed:
It now seems clear that the Soviet Union will
exert predominant political influence over the
areas in question. While this Government would
not want to oppose itself to such a political
configuration, neither would it desire to see
American influence in this part of the world
completely nullified.
In the situation which is likely to prevail in
Poland and the Balkan states after the war, the
United States can hope to make its influence felt
13The New York Times, December 17, 1944, p. 4

only if some degree of equal opportunity in trade,
investment, and access to sources of information
is preserved, American aid in the reconstruction
of these areas would not only gain the good-will
of the populations involved, but would also help
bring about conditions which would permit the
adoption of relatively liberal policies of this
nature. 14
These words are once practical and naive. Their
practicality comes in the realization that American influ-
ence, never very significant in the Balkans, would not be
aided and abetted through the approaching Soviet hegemony.
The naivity appears in this obvious understatement and mis-
understanding of the growing Soviet strength, Yugoslavia
was apparently considered to be too Western oriented to be
swept completely into the Soviet orbit. Churchill did not
seem to fear such an event; on this point there were those
in the Department of State who were not entirely in agree-
ment with this position, who saw Tito as communizing all of
Yugoslavia at war's end. One of these was the American
Ambassador to Italy, Alexander C. Kirk. Kirk sent a tele-
gram to Stettinius suggesting that "we might reexamine our
position in respect to Yugoslavia" because "the present
ruling group means to make use of every opportunity to
enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union while seeking to
14Yalta Conference
, op . cit . , p. 235
15Armstrong, 0£. cit . , p. 31.
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16discredit the western allies." Another supporter of this
position was the U. S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., W.
Averell Harriman, who warned of the ever greater spectre of
17Russian desires in Eastern Europe.
The British were unable to influence King Peter that
he should approve the Tito-Subasic agreement primarily be-
cause of its treatment of the monarch, and the affair was
gradually being bypassed by the war—much to Tito's advan-
tage. Both the British and the Soviets were by now very
piqued at King Peter's constant objections to certain
points of the proposed agreement; and both countries re-
quested that the United States send instructions to Richard
C. Patterson, Jr., the U. S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, that
would influence the Yugoslav King to give way in his objec-
tions and approve the agreement. The State Department once
more refused, saying that both the King and !>ubasic were
18fully aware of the American position.
In January, 1945, as the Department of State pre-
pared for the departure of President Roosevelt for the
Malta meeting with Churchill and then on to Yalta to meet
Marshal Stalin, the official American policy in the Balkans
Yalta Conference , op . cit . , p. 434.
17Ibid.
, pp. 64-66.
18Yalta Conference , op . cit . , p. 261.
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remained one of non-intervention with great hopes for popu-
lar national solutions under the Atlantic Charter's con-
cepts. Because Yugoslavia was unique in its most effective
resistance to the German occupation forces and its two-
government strife, a special briefing paper was prepared
and submitted to the President on January 18*b, along with
the other position papers covering those areas of the world
19
of primary interest to the great leaders. How well the
President was able to brief himself during his trip, and
how much he left to his "native" ability and intuition is a
matter of continuing conjecture. Both Stettinius and the
President's close adviser, Harry Hopkins, traveled by
separate means and were, therefore, unavailable for inten-
sive briefings; and the President is known to have used the
20
voyage for a thorough rest. In the case of Yugoslavia,
the situation in London was so fluid that even day-to-day
briefings could not have been of any significant help at
Yalta.
At the same time that Roosevelt was receiving the
briefing book, King Peter's advisers, who had previously
convinced him that he should not concur with the Tito-
19Yalta Conference , op . cit . , p. 42.
20Charles F. Delzell, Russian Power in Central-
Eastern Europe (in The Meaning of Yalta , ed. John L. Snell




Subasic agreement, now informed him that Yalta would decide
Yugoslavia's political future without regard to the agree-
ment. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Joseph C. Grew,
informed the traveling Secretary, Edward Stettinius that
Tito believed that King Peter was stalling for time on the
21presumption that he would receive American support.
Sidney Gruson, reporting from London, further explained the
King's position:
And it is equally clear that they [the King's ad-
visers] feel President Roosevelt will be the chief
protagonist for their stand that the Yugoslavs
have not fought to have a Communist government
imposed on them without a chance to record their
will in a secret ballot. 22
King Peter compounded things by an all but official
dismissal of Premier Subasic that found SubaSic threatening
to take the cabinet to Belgrade and join with Tito—thus
effectively ignoring the King. In Washington, Mr. Grew was
interviewed about this and a Churchill intimation that the
United States now approved of the British position on the
agreement. His answers were very general, inferring con-
23tinued non-participation by the United States.
21Yalta Conference , op . cit . , p. 961.
22iThe New York Times
, January 18, 1945, p. 6.
23Ibid. , January 24, 1945, p. 4.
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By the first of February, this vague statement was
proven to be a smoke-screen for an unprecedented United
States action. It was understood, according to a New York
Times report, that the United States had made it clear to
Subasic and the King that Washington wished the controversy
settled. Mr. Grew instructed Ambassador Patterson to advise
both of the principals that the United States believed it
to be in the general interest that the Yugoslav Government
be established in Belgrade as soon as possible, and that
the American mission go there accredited to a Yugoslav
government as unified and representative as possible. The
King was left to deduce that unless he settled, the United
States might be obliged to accredit its Ambassador to a
24Belgrade regime that he did not recognize.
The American pressure on the Yugoslavs gave new
meaning to President Roosevelt's hint at a change of policy
from non-intervention to "cannot and will not shrink from
the political responsibilities which follow in the wake of
the Battle." The New York Times concluded:
That the President and the State Department are
moving into these controversial questions with
extreme caution is apparent from the way in which
this incident was handled. Some observers here
believe, nevertheless, that this incident marks
the beginning of a more active American policy in
European political affairs. 25
24The New York Times





The young King was helpless and finally agreed to
Subasic's trip to Belgrade and to the forming of a new
government—without him. On the fifth of March, Marshal
Tito was entrusted with the mandate to form a united Yugo-
26
slavian government. Although the King's Regents were
included in Tito's cabinet, the National Liberation Com-
mittee continued to hold the "reigns of power."
Dr. Charles Zalar, a former Yugoslav career diplomat
and later a member of the Library of Congress research
staff, in preparing the Senate study on Yugoslav Communism,
accuses the British of being guilty of selling out the
Yugoslav King:
The exasperation of the British government with
the Yugoslav politicians is completely understand-
able. What is not understandable is that they
should have tried to solve the problem by turning
the Yugoslav peoples over to communism. This, in
effect, is what they did. When they turned away
from the Yugoslav government in London, they
turned immediately toward Tito. 2
7
Dr. Zalar does not mention the position or the participation
of the United States in this episode. Of course, his view
is hindsight, but Zalar was very critical of Churchill's
intelligence sources. Dr. Zalar and many others refer to
the reports of Partisan military achievement as "exaggerated
26 Ibid. , March 6, 1945, p. 6.





and falsified," and accuse fellow-travelers and Communists
28in key positions as the perpetrators. One result of this
false intelligence can be seen in this newspaper report:
American aircraft have several times attacked
targets described in briefings as "enemy strong-
holds" on information provided by Brigadier Mac-
Lean's [Fitzroy Hew MacLean, Churchill's choice
to command the British Military Mission to the
Yugoslav Partisans] mission and they have turned
out to be General Mihailovic's centers ,29
Regardless of the suspicions, the confusion, and the
lack of trustworthy intelligence, the political decision
was to go with the man who already had the greatest mili-
tary and administrative control within Yugoslavia, By
pressing to get Dr. 3ubasi6 to Belgrade perhaps something
could be salvaged in the way of representative government.




29The New York Times , December 17, 1944, p. 4. For
an analysis of the intelligence information the Allies were
receiving, see David Martin, Ally Betrayed (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1946), pp. 84-ToTT

CHAPTER II
THE UNITED STATES, YALTA, AND YUGOSLAVIA
Within forty-eight hours of returning from his
Crimean rendezvous with Prime Minister Churchill and
Marshal Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the
first of March, 1945, appeared before a joint session of
Congress. In this, his first and last "personal report,"
the President exulted that the agreements at Yalta and the
coming victory of the Allies would produce
the end of the system of unilateral action and
exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and
balances of power and all the other expediencies
which have been tried for centuries and failed .1
For the United States, the Yalta declaration was the climax
of American hopes that, after victory, collaboration with
the Soviet Union would be possible. Whether fortunately or
unfortunately, Roosevelt did not live long enough to see
his cherished aspirations for peaceful harmony wither away
from the intense cold of the political climate following
the war.
One great worry of the United States, as the Yalta
Conference approached, seems to have been the perpetuation
The text of President Roosevelt's Yalta report to




of the concept of "spheres of influence," Cordell Hull,
who was forced to retire as Secretary of State in the fall
of 1944 because of poor health, had been constantly railing
against any agreements creating spheres of influence. He
was "flatly opposed to any division of Europe or sections
2
of Europe into spheres of influence." As Hull came to
concentrate more and more on the postwar international
peace organization—later to become the United Nations—the
idea of such spheres became anathema to his dream for a
truly international peace. Hull's dread can be seen in
these words from the Department of State:
While we acknowledge the usefulness of arrangements
for the conduct of the war, we cannot give our
approval to such plans as would extend beyond the
military field and retard the processes of broader
international cooperation •
3
Into the midst of the United States fear of re-
established spheres stepped Winston Churchill and his
infamous percentage agreement with Marshal Stalin. During
the October 1944 Foreign Minister's conference in Moscow,
Mr. Churchill admitted to having slipped a piece of paper
to Marshal Stalin on which he divided up the Balkan states
2Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull , Vol. II
(New York: The MacmilTan Company, 1948), pp. 1451 and 1648
3Yalta Conference (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955), p. 104.

18
into percentages of influence: Rumania and Bulgaria 90 per
cent-10 per cent in the favor of the Russians; Greece 90
per cent-10 per cent in the favor of Great Britain; and
Yugoslavia 50 per cent-50 per cent. Stalin nodded his head
in agreement and checked off the paper with his blue pen-
cil. 4
This agreement, according to one of President Roose-
velt's closest advisers, James F. Byrnes, extended only
through the period of military occupation. Any military
action the British felt necessary in order to quell in-
ternal disorders in Greece would have no interference from
the Soviets. The British would not interfere in Rumania
and Bulgaria.
Perhaps to understand better Churchill's position in
being willing to dispose casually of so questionable an
issue, we should realize to what extent Great Britain was
watching her former world prestige being eased into the
hands of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Such
an attempt at an agreement, then, can be seen as seeking a
guarantee for at least some degree of British influence in
Eastern Europe. Churchill's recounting of his proposal to
4Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 227.
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 55.

19
Stalin indicates that the division of influence was a
simple matter quickly done. That he did not mention the
matter to President Roosevelt in his frequent messages
during his conference with Stalin receives no explanation
in his memoirs.
What Stalin thought of Churchill's motives is not
available; but it has been surmised that the very fact that
Churchill took the initiative must have indicated to Stalin
that the British position was now uncertain, and under
pressure Great Britain would retreat in future exchanges.
Because Churchill had been willing to divide the Balkans
into spheres, any reference to a moral stand at future con-
ferences would be weakened materially. The fact that
Stalin never once questioned the British Government's
motives in her determined intervention in Greece, while the
British Labor Party and many Americans spoke very criti-
cally of the affair, has been cited as convincing proof
that Stalin was true to his bargain, at least up to the
7time of the Yalta conference.
Forrest C. Pogue, The Struggle for a New Order (in
The Meaning of Yalta : Big Three Diplomacy and the New
Balance of Power
, ed. John L. Snell. Baton Rouge, Loui-
siana!"" Lousiana State University Press, 1956), p. 26.
7Charles F. Delzell, Russian Power in Central-
Eastern Europe (in Snell, op. citTT

20
The American diplomats in Moscow that October got
wind of the percentage agreement and informed Secretary
Hull. However, they were only able to guess at the per-
centages other than the 50-50 agreement on Yugoslavia.
Hull recorded:
• • •Later the Russians took it for granted that
Britain and the United States had assigned them a
certain portion of the Balkans including Rumania
and Bulgaria, as a sphere of influence. This
assumption had its untoward effect at the Yalta
Conference.
8
The Yugoslavs were also very unhappy when they found out
9that Stalin was willing to casually "divide our skin."
This can be considered one of the more significant seeds of
discord that eventually led to the 1948 Yugoslav-Russian
break.
The Department of State showed its concern over this
possible division agreement between the British and the




p. 1458. This was actually the
second time the division of spheres had arisen between
Churchill and Stalin. The first was in the spring of 1944
when Churchill, after broaching the subject to Stalin,
managed to convince Roosevelt that such a purely military
decision was worth a trial. Roosevelt agreed to a three-
month trial against the advice of his Department of State.
It is obvious though that the long-range political implica-
tions were far more meaningful to the Prime Minister.
9Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York
The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 35.
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attention in the President's Yalta briefing book. Among
those points made were:
We have also placed on record our uncertainty as
to what extent the proposed agreement , in the for-
mulation of which both Mr, Churchill and Marshal
Stalin seem to have had a part, may be related to
the arrangement between the British and Soviet
Governments defining their respective interests in
Southeastern Europe.
If an effort is made to associate this Government
with this Yugoslav arrangement, it is recommended:
(1) that we should emphasize our complete inde-
pendence of action in dealing with the Yugoslav
situation, despite any commitments which may be
or may have been made by the British and Soviet
Governments; and (2) that we should make any endorse-
ment of a new administration in Yugoslavia contin-
gent on freedom of movement and access to public
opinion in Yugoslavia for our observers to survey
the situation. 10
Robert Wolff, a wartime member of the O.S.S., and an ac-
knowledged expert in both Balkan history and Balkan
languages , looks upon this viewpoint of the Department of
State as an "abstract, not to say immature, view of inter-
national affairs." He accuses the Department of State of
standing on pious moral ground, with little to offer as a
substitute. 11
Yalta Conference , op . cit
. , pp. 262-263. A full
treatment of the American policy toward spheres of influ-
ence and the problems besetting the British at this time
can be found on pp. 103-8.
Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UniversTty Press, 1956),
p. 257. Wolff's view is somewhat harsh in the light of the
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In reviewing the minutes and related documents of
the Yalta Conference, it is immediately evident that only a
minimum time was spent on the subject of Yugoslavia. The
majority of the talk centered around Poland over which
there were extensive conflicting opinions and views, Yugo-
slavia, on the other hand, was a subject on which prior
agreement was reached, at least between Prime Minister
12Churchill and Marshal Stalin. All that was left, there-
fore, was to convince President Roosevelt that a simple
declaration to this effect was sufficient. During the
Yugoslav discussions neither the President nor his staff
raised any pressing questions, leaving the subject pri-
13
marily to the British and Soviet delegates. The Presi-
dent's mind seems to have been mostly occupied with Poland
(perhaps the extensive Polish vote in the United States)
and the creation of the United Nations.
Stalin questioned the British on at least two occa-
sions, asking what was delaying the creation of the unified
Tito-Subasic government. Churchill's reply indicated his
moral responsibility the Department of State obviously felt
in this matter. American officials wanted to avoid any
accusation of selling out Yugoslavia to the Russians.
12Yalta Conference






disgust with King Peter's obstinacy over the formation of a
14
regency. All parties to the conference seemed to concur
with Marshal Stalin's request for an immediate declaration
on the Tito-Subas'ic agreement, but it was not until
February 10, 194 5, that they agreed on the wording of a
telegram to both Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic asking for
action. As it turned out, the urgency of the telegram
was wasted because Dr. Subasid was finding it very diffi-
cult to reach Belgrade to join Tito. As Mr. Grew informed
Secretary Stettinius:
The departure of the Subasic Government has been
postponed for several days. King Peter has been in-
formed by Subasic that Simovich and Sotej are un-
acceptable to Tito as regents and must be replaced.
The King will insist on having Sutej and will not
permit his government to leave until the regents are
appointed and approved. 1«
Grew later amended this message by saying that it was
Subasic rather than Tito who objected to Simovi6, and that
the British believed Subasic would go to Belgrade even
17
without King Peter's approval.
When the final drafts of the conference were con-
cluded, the section on Yugoslavia took the form of a recom-













different than the telegram that the three leaders sent on
February tenth:
We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and
Dr. Subasic that the Agreement between them should
be put into effect immediately, and that a new
Government should be formed on the basis of that
Agreement,
We also recommend that as soon as the new Govern-
ment has been formed, it should declare that:
(i) The Anti-fascist Assembly of National Libera-
tion (Avnoj ) should be extended to include members
of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who
have not compromised themselves by collaboration
with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as
a temporary Parliament; and
(ii) legislative acts passed by the Anti-fascist
Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be
subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent
Assembly. 1 **
The American delegation could find little hint of spheres
of influence in this declaration and raised no objections
to its inclusion in the Yalta agreements.
Yugoslavia could also be regarded as an Interested
party to the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" issued by
the Big Three at Yalta; that declaration that opted for
solving political and economic difficulties by democratic
means, forming representative and democratic governments,
and carrying out free elections. And yet, Yugoslavia was




not even Stalin, knew how Marshal Tito would react to the
19
conference's recommendations.
President Roosevelt's attitude toward Tito and the
Yugoslav government enigma can perhaps be detected in these
words from his personal report to Congress
:
Agreement was reached on Yugoslavia ... and we hope
that it is in the process of fulfillment. But it is
not only that, but in some other places we have to
remember there are a great number of prima donnas in
the world, all who wish to be heard. 20
Whatever else the Yalta declaration on Yugoslavia
was intended to do, the one thing that it did accomplish
immediately was to obtain for the future regime in Yugo-
slavia its international recognition.
On March 2, 1945, the Yugoslav regents were finally
appointed and took their oath. All three (a Serb, a Croat,
and a Slovene) were Tito's candidates although not members
of the Communist Party. On March 5, Dr. s'ubas'ic's Royal
Yugoslav Government resigned to the Regency Council. The
same day, the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia
handed its resignation to the Presidium of the AVNOJ. On





In quoting the speech, The New York Times of March
2, 1945 (P. 12), reported that this allusion to prima
donnas was ad-libbed by the President.
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headed by Marshal Tito, as proposed by the Presidium of the
AVNOJ. This was the first and the last act of the Regency
Council.
Tito's Partisans made up the great majority of the
ministers. Tito's first pronouncement in his new status
was made for the benefit of the outside world on March 11.
Tito pledged to his countrymen to cooperate with the post-
war international organizations including friendly rela-
tions with the Allies. He also pledged free elections as
soon as possible, a regulation of the economy, and civil
liberties. "The Government will take part in the inter-
national organizations and activities aimed at securing
21peace." The hopes of Yalta echoed throughout his speech.
By the middle of the summer of 1945, Japan followed
Germany in succumbing to the Allied strength. Now the eyes
of the world were ready to focus on the workings of peace
and freedom. In Yugoslavia, there seemed to be differences
of opinion on how best to interpret such phrases as "civil
liberties," "democratic processes," and "unified leader-
ship." As Stalin had opined, Tito was a proud man who, as
22the popular head of a regime, might resent advice.
2 lThe New York Times , March 11, 1945, p. 28.
22Yalta Conference
, op . cit . , p. 781.
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Mr. R. H. Markham, a leading American educator and
journalist, voiced the views of many of Yugoslavia's exiles
and others who followed Tito's actions closely when he
spoke of Yalta's results in Yugoslavia six months after the
conference:
None of the specific provisions was carried out
by the new Government. Far from being "broadly
representative of all democratic elements," this
new Government is completely dominated by one
party—the Communist—which is authorized to speak
for only a small fraction of the nation ....
Political freedom, freedom of the press, freedom
of assembly, as well as a guarantee of personal
freedom which the new Provisional Government of
Yugoslavia was bound to guarantee, are nonexistent."
As far as the official United States Policy was con-
cerned, the Yugoslav situation was not turning out well at
all. The complaints from Yugoslav emigrants and Mihailovic
boosters were backed by two congressional inquiries even
before the Yalta meeting. It became obvious that even the
few Yugoslav ministers who were not former members of the
Partisans had no authority and no voice in the actual ad-
ministration of Yugoslavia. The general elections were set
for November. Neither British nor American diplomats
expected anything but an overwhelming victory for Tito.
23
The New York Times (letter to the editors),
August 19, 19337 p. 18.

28
The territorial claims in Europe also bothered the
American diplomats. Both the British and the Americans
hoped for a just and equitable solution in each instance.
Mr. Joseph Grew expressed the U. S. attitude:
It is a firm policy of the United States, as its
allies have been officially informed, that terri-
torial change should be made only after thorough
study and after full consultation and deliberation
between the various governments concerned. 24
Yugoslavia was especially adamant about adjustments in the
Yugoslav-Austrian frontier and the Venezia Giulia area
(including Trieste). Washington saw the problem "as far
more than a mere frontier controversy between two claimants,
It raises the issue of the settlement of international dis-
25putes by orderly process rather than unilateral actions."
One of the problem areas, the Yugoslav-Austrian border, was
raised at Yalta; but the confrerees agreed that its solu-
tion would have to come later. Now Yugoslavia was claiming
the Venezia Giulia by right of conquest, and only some
rapid diplomatic maneuvering kept the situation from erupt-
ing into conflict. Tito's claim to the occupation of
Trieste was, according to the Allies, contrary to an agree-
ment of the previous February providing for occupation of
24
U. S. Department of State, Dul Let in , Vol. XT I
(Washington: Government Frinting Office, 1945), p. 902.






all Italy by the Western Powers. The matter was finally
resolved by a joint agreement between the United States,
26Great Britain, and Yugoslavia. But the issue of Trieste
would plague the United States-Yugoslav relations until the
disposition in 1954.
Although the issue of the return of King Peter to
Yugoslavia was supposed to be settled by the election in
November, 1945, Tito had already taken it upon himself to
change the name of the state to Democratic Federative
Yugoslavia, its flag, and its coat-of-arms , all of which
were supposedly to be changed only by a constituent assem-
bly. Even the new postage stamps issued after the war bore
27the likeness of the Partisan leader.
The pressure upon the non-Partisan ministers, and
their very frustration, finally culminated in August in the
resignation of Mr. Milan Grol, the Vice-Premier of the new
government. When the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Dr.
Suba^ic, also submitted his resignation two months later,
the coalition government proposed by the United States,
Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. at Yalta collapsed. In




27Constant In Fotitch, The War We Lost (New York:
Viking Press, 1948), p. 309.
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Tito regime had employed in Yugoslavia certain totalitarian
tactics, including the maintenance of a secret underground
police organization, that free elections had thus been
rendered impossible, and that other conditions required by
28
recognition of the coalition regime had not been met,
Subasic had been unable to go to London, where the first
conference of the foreign ministers of the four Great
Powers was in session, as provided in the Yalta agreement.
Konstantin Fotid accuses the Yugoslav government of pre-
venting Subasic's attendance by manufacturing the excuse
that, due to a sudden sickness, such a trip would imperil
Subasic's life. He resigned shortly thereafter, prompt-
ing Tito to observe to the Czech Ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Josef Korbel, "Subasic resigned on the instruction which
30he received from abroad."
These actions could not go unnoticed in London and
Washington, but no official could deduce a peaceable method
of coercing the new Yugoslav government into abiding by
their former agreement. Now in both foreign offices, the
game turned to one of awaiting the November elections. On
28





30Josef Korbel, Tito's Communism (Denver, Colorado:





the eve of the elections, C. L. Sulzberger saw the British
attitude as right in line with that of Washington:
It is believed that Britain is not eager to be
tough in eastern European areas where there are
differences with the Soviet Union [referred to as
the uselessness of backing lost causes J «...
It is by no means likely that Britain will
cancel her recognition of the Yugoslav Government
despite the probability the elections, run under
a law much disliked here, will unquestionably
result in a landslide for Marshal Tito.
British and United States statesmen have been
discussing quietly what is termed a reassessment
of their Yugoslav policy. There is no indication
that they will put enormous pressure on Belgrade
aside from certain economic factors that have been
stressed. They will probably continue to talk,
politely suggesting that Marshal Tito rearrange
his regime along lines satisfactory to the West.^1
Exiled Yugoslav politicians sent frantic messages to
both the United States and British Governments claiming
that the elections would not be free. They criticized the
two allied governments for not forcing the Tito regime to
abide by (their interpretation of) the Tito-Subas'ic agree-
32
ment and the Yalta decision. However, as Mr. Armstrong
pointed out:
The British and the Americans found themselves in
the humiliating position of being unable to do
anything to obtain compliance with either the
31The New York Times , November 10, 1945, p. 3.
32 Tbid. , November 10, 194 5, p. 3.
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3 Ibid ., November 10, 1945, p. 3.
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Declaration on Liberated Europe or the Tito-
Shubashich Agreement. 33
The election itself, on November 11, 1945, was not
nearly as complicated as the exiles had tried to claim.
Since there was little strength in any political party
other than Tito's National Front, there was little opposi-
tion at the voting polls. The confusion of adjusting once
more to peacetime perhaps prevented the democratic parties
from joining together in an effort to compete against the
Partisans and their National Front. The issue presented to
the people was the "hero" Tito against the King who had run
to England during the war. Even more simply stated in
their propaganda it was a monarchy against a republic.
Without the strength to counter this image, the democratic
parties went down to a resounding defeat. Voting injustices
and irregularities were charged and there is little doubt
that all this and more happened; but the results would have
been almost the same without the irregularities. Regardless
of the political pressure that might have been brought to
bear, the people—the voters—were mentally and even
physically tired. It was a most confusing time.
Both the government and the people expected some






Korbel says that the Yugoslav people listened avidly to the
Voice of America and the BBC, reading into every bit of
news that Washington and London were following the situa-
tion very closely and that they were resolved to invoke the
34
articles of the Yalta declaration. Tito told Ambassador
Korbel that he did not expect any direct diplomatic inter-
vention. What he did worry about was the international
recognition his government needed, and he was rather sur-
prised that there was no official intervention on the part
35
of the Allied powers.
The Constituent Assembly met on November 29, 1945,
the second anniversary of the session of the AVNOJ at Jajce.
Once the election results were verified (96 per cent in
favor of the People's Front) and the deputies confirmed,
the Assembly declared Yugoslavia a republic—the Federative
People's Republic of Yugoslavia. And then, by unanimous
vote, the monarchy was abolished and King Peter, accused of
having supported collaborationists, and his heirs were
36divested of all rights. The King appealed to his onetime
staunch supporter, Great Britain, but the postwar British
34
Korbel, o£. cit





The New York Times, November 30, 1945, p. 1

34
weakness and the traditional lack of support for monarchies
in the United States served to dim the King's hopes.
The United States waited four weeks before declaring
its intentions towards Yugoslavia. On December 22, instruc-
tions were sent to Ambassador Patterson to inform Marshal
Tito that nothwithstanding its [Yugoslavia's] failure to
hold free and untrammeled elections" the United States
would now recognize the Tito Government "on the assumption
that the Belgrade regime would give the customary assur-
ances that international obligations and existing treaties
37
with us would be respected." Dean Acheson added to this
that recognition did not imply approval of the policies of
the regime, and expressed the hope that, in the evolution
of events, Yugoslavia would develop conditions of which the
38
United States would finally and wholeheartedly approve.
The British made a simultaneous announcement of
recognition and thereby discredited the monarchy. Peter
was now permanently cut off except for the formal amenities




Bulletin , Vol. XIII (1945), p. 1021.
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For some as yet unexplained reason, Tito did not
answer Washington with the necessary pledges of being pre-
pared to observe the existing treaties and agreements.
When quizzed in late February, 1946, Secretary of State
Byrnes admitted that the recognition of Yugoslavia had not
been completed, and the full accreditation of Mr. Patterson
40
would have to await the proper action by Yugoslavia.
Finally, on April 2, 1946, the Yugoslav Government sent the
formal assurances that she accepted the existing treaties
and agreements. On April 18, the United States accorded
Yugoslavia full diplomatic recognition.
The opinions have varied as to why the West, and
especially the United States, should so readily accord
recognition to an obviously communist government. The
critics point to the Yalta agreements, especially the sec-
tion on liberated Europe, and declare that the Allies did
not live up to their promises. In retrospect, it is diffi-
cult to support this accusation against the United States.
Certainly the Americans, by this time unquestionably deeply
involved in European affairs, did not lack political acuity,
The moral obligations involved: the reports of terrorist
activity, restriction of civil liberties, persecutions,
although probably valid, could not outweigh the political
40
Ibid
. , February 27, 1946, p. 14.
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decision for recognition. In the strict terms of Yalta,
the elections had been held and the people were afforded
the opportunity to vote for or against the National Front.
Also, in August, 1945, some of the prewar members of the
Yugoslav Parliament were added to the AVNOJ, thus carrying
out both the Tito-Subasic agreement and the Yalta declara-
tion.
It was undoubtedly politically expedient to use the
recognition of Yugoslavia, as well as those of Bulgaria and
Rumania, as a sign of good faith toward the Russians, Al-
though Fotic calls this "pursuit of the mirage of collabora-
41tion," the Western nations hoped to ease the growing
Soviet pressures, and at the smallest price. The one re-
maining consideration for the American Government was the
aversion to conflict that was now prevalent in the United
States. Overt action of interference by the United States
in Yugoslavia would have received the support of only those
few emigrants who really cared.
President Truman had made one last effort toward a
high-sounding moral stand when, in January, 1946, he said
that the country reserved the right to withdraw even con-
ditional recognition of the Yugoslav Government if it fell




short of the democratic processes agreed to at Yalta.
The political fact was, however, that the United States had
agreed at Yalta to recognize the Tito regime, subject to
conditions. Now the United States had to go through with
that recognition.
Once recognition was accorded, the United States
wanted to shift most of its dealing with Yugoslavia to the
forum of the United Nations, hoping that the moral pressure
of that august international organization, of which Yugo-
slavia was a charter member, would force a modification of
the terror, purges, and trials reportedly sweeping Yugo-
slavia.
42
The New York Times, January 9, 1946, p. 1

CHAPTER III
THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
ADMINISTRATION AND YUGOSLAVIA
The ravages of the war were so impressively shocking
that a proposal was made by various allied governments to
create an international agency whose sole purpose would be
to attempt to relieve the suffering and misery in those coun-
tries being freed from the Axis occupation. By agreement
among the allied nations in September, 1943, this agency was
named the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration (UNRRA). The term "United Nations" was a favorite
of President Roosevelt's since the days of the Atlantic
Charter; and since the United States was, of necessity, the
leading nation in the new organization, the name was quickly
agreed upon. UNRRA eventually included some forty-eight
nations, all pledged to aid the war-stricken areas of
Europe and the East by allotting 1 per cent of their na-
tional income of 1943. As the President explained the
situation to Congress in his budget message for the fiscal
year 1945:
As we close in on the enemy we are confronted with
the necessity of initiating the restoration of civil-
ian life and productivity in the liberated areas.
Both relief and the commencement of the process of




In the liberated areas, relief must of necessity,
be a military problem at the outset. This job will
be turned over to civilian administration as soon
as feasible. For this reason the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has been
created.
1
In the eyes of the United States, UNRRA offered a means
toward postwar stability. However, as on many other
issues, both the President and the Department of State
found out early that Congress wanted to share the responsi-
bility of providing for this new agency.
The first committee meetings took place in Atlantic
City, New Jersey, in November of 1943. The internationally
famous names present lent prestige to the inauguration of
the agency: Jean Monnet of France, Lester Pearson of
Canada, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, and Dean Acheson of
the United States. The first Director General was the former
Governor of New York, Herbert H. Lehman. Yugoslavia was
represented by the Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States,
Konstantin Foti6, a member of the Royal Yugoslav Government
in exile. Mr. Fotic said that even his country, where de-
struction of population and resources had been extreme
because of the guerrilla warfare, would be able to make
2
contributions to the relief pool. Despite such magnanimous
As quoted in The New York Times , January 14, 1944,
p. 10.
2The New York Times, November 14, 194.1, p. 43.
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gestures, it was obvious that the United States would have
to bear the major burden of support.
In a somewhat idealistic tone, the committee an-
nounced that those governments receiving food and other
relief from UNRRA would be required to refrain from using
them as a political weapon to maintain themselves in power.
Although those governments who were able should have charge
of distribution in their own countries so that national
sovereignty might be preserved, the agency would run
periodic checks, in order to attempt to assure proper dis-
3tribution and avoid inequities and other violations. The
checks turned out to be one of UNRRA' s greatest burdens.
After procurement of funds, for which the United
4States was initially responsible, the main obstacle to
smooth operations as UNRRA attempted to launch its program
was the non-availability of transportation to deliver the
relief supplies. The first goal was to provide aid in
regard to health, welfare, and repatriation of displaced
persons to Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece. The idea was
that, as the military moved on, UNRRA would take over the
The New York Times , November 25, 1943, p. 31.
4
Bulletin , Vol. X (1944), p. 535. Congress main-
tained a running battle with the President and the Depart-




main burden of that type of assistance. Until peace was
declared, at least in Europe, the distribution of relief
funds could not compete with the prosecution of the war.
Supplies for the military always received the priority.
Relief for Yugoslavia was ready to begin by the fall
of 1944, but was held up by a dispute over distribution
control. Tito's Committee of National Liberation refused
to accept the UNRRA aid because it was proposed that tiNRRA
set up its own machinery for distribution instead of using
what the Committee referred to as "the already established
5
organ of the people's authority." The bickering also in-
cluded the number of observers to be allowed in Yugoslavia.
Finally, on January 21, 1945, it was announced that both
Tito and the Royal Yugoslav Government had concurred with
the proposal for the United States and Great Britain,
through UNRRA, to initiate supplies and services to Yugo-
slavia, while Yugoslav authorities would administer them.
The stalemate of many weeks was ended because UNRRA offi-
cials agreed to the appointment of a Russian, Colonel
Mikail Sergeichik, as the Director General of the UNRRA
mission in Yugoslavia rather than an American or a Britisher
The New York Times , October 3, 1944, p. 1.




as was first proposed. As C. L. Sulzberger explained it:
The Allies 1 representatives will supervise the
admission of relief supplies and their distribu-
tion to actual Yugoslav organization, but the
field distribution will be controlled personally
and directly by Yugoslavs appointed by the Com-
mittee of National Liberation. 8
A total of one hundred observers was agreed upon , and to
meet immediate needs, rolling stock (locomotives, trucks),
and clothes for the rest of the winter were hurried to the
Adriatic ports by then under the control of the Partisans.
Marshal Tito was quick to express his appreciation
for the aid. In a message he forwarded to a dinner gather-
ing in New York City in February, 1945, he thanked America
for all the financial contributions made during the war;
and he renewed his plea for increased relief. Senator
James E. Murray of Montana, one of the guest speakers at
the dinner in honor of Tito's gallant stand against Germany,
told the guests that Tito was a great leader who must be
9
assisted in re-establishing the economy of Yugoslavia.
When the war ended in Europe, transportation diffi-
culties eased and the flow of UNRRA goods greatly increased.
7
Eric L. Pridonoff , Tito's Yugoslavia (Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1955), p. 215~"T^
8The New York Times , January 23, 1945, p. 4.
9Ibid. , February 8, 1945, p. 6.
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Although the problem of authority between the military
occupation and the UNRRA missions remained, the military
could now turn its attention to promoting the objectives of
UNRRA without as much distraction.
Groups outside of UNRRA began criticizing Yugoslavia
for only paying $5,000 of its allotted share of $70,000 to
the UNRRA fund, while such nations as Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and France had paid their share in full. Dr.
Rudolf Bicanic, Yugoslavia's representative to UNRRA, asked
for greater choice for Yugoslavia in the final disposition
of supplies because:
Some nations have paid in the blood of their
peoples and others have paid in goods for the
victory of the United Nations .... Of a total
of 5,500,000 people in Yugoslavia directly affected
by the war, every third person is a victim of war;
in every family two members at least are affected
by war.H
Perhaps this also explains Yugoslavia's tardiness in paying
off the UNRRA allotment.
In September, 1945, President Truman sent a message
to Congress asking for an increase of the initial limita-
tion of $1,350,000,000 to complete the work of UNRRA.
The New York Times
,
April 12, 1945, p. 12, It
should be noted that at this time Australia had paid none
of its allotted share of the UNRRA funl.
3.
As quoted in The New York Times, August 15, 1945,
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Truman said that with the end of the war there was a lot be
be done, and predicted that UNRRA' s work would be absorbed
12by the United Nations organization at the end of 1946,
The request for funds prompted The New York Times to tally
the UNRRA assistance to Yugoslavia up to that time:
In Yugoslavia, UNRRA is credited with contribut-
ing to the principal part of the diet for at least
3,000,000 persons and to have supplemented the food
of 4,000,000 more. The agency flew in spare parts
for Yugoslav harvest machines; closed up great
transportation gaps with tractors and trucks and
rails and rolling stock; sent raw cotton and wool
into the mills, and furnished medical supplies to
thousands.
Yugoslavia had such a serious crop failure this
year that 50,000 tons of wheat a month are con-
sidered necessary to carry the people through the
winter. Marshal Tito himself took a hand to step
up by 50 percent the clearance of supplies out of
the ports to the people.^
Ambassador Patterson contended that the aid supplied was
not enough. The transition from war to peace was very
difficult for Yugoslavia. Even though Yugoslavia's politi-
cal difficulties would be settled in time, more help was
needed. The Ambassador added:
They need all kinds of economic help. They need
it badly. About 75 percent of the rolling stock,
farm equipment and livestock was stolen by the
l2Bulletin , Vol. XIII (1945), pp. 575-577.
13The New York Times , September 9, 1945, p. 17. See
also Bulletin, Vol. XIII (1945), pp. 382-384.
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Germans and the rehabilitation period is going to
be terrific. 14
The winter of 1945-1946 was a difficult one for UNRRA
in Yugoslavia. The two initial problems, slowness of the
supplies in being shipped and the adjustment of authority
between the military and the UNRRA officials, continued to
plague UNRRA efforts. The dilatory food shipments
threatened the starvation of 3,000,000 Yugoslavs. Congress
was asked to appropriate another $1,350,000,000 as the
United States continued to contribute over 70 per cent of
the UNRRA funds. Despite UNRRA »s generosity, thousands
of Europeans and Asians died because of the transition time
necessary between appropriation and delivery. Even once
the supplies arrived, the bureaucratic problems within each
country meant a further delay in delivery to the needy.
It was during this same winter that UNRRA was also
faced with increasing criticism from both Europe and the
United States. Tito's communist government was especially
suspect. The charges in the case of Yugoslavia ranged from
accusations that the people were not being told that the
supplies were from UNRRA but rather from Tito and Stalin,
14The New York Times , September 9, 1945, p. 28.
15Bulletln
,
Vol. XIII (1945), p. 808.
l ft
These deaths are cited more than one.- Ln both The
New York Times and the Congressional Record .

46
to claims that Tito's 750,000 man army was entirely sup-
plied by UNRRA. As UNRRA ran its course during 1946, those
17particular charges were never satisfactorily dispelled.
In a very perceptive article, Albion Ross summed up
the political implications of the supposedly apolitical
UNRRA:
UNRRA has become of decisive importance in this
part of the world lEuropeJ in determining whether
the Communist dominated regimes or the Government
that are not Communist shall have the immense ad-
vantage of being able to lead the way to reconstruc-
tion and to the return of a fair degree of prosperity.
Any Government's success or failure here depends
fundamentally at present upon the aid it receives
from UNRRA and the nature of that aid. 1 **
The former mayor of New York City and the then
Director General of UNRRA, Fiorello H. La Guardia, became
incensed over Ross' remarks and a series of articles he had
written critical of UNRRA 's status in Yugoslavia. But
Ross' criticism was nothing compared to the torrent of
abuse that fell on UNRRA later in the summer of 1946 when
two unarmed American aircraft were downed in Yugoslavia,
one with the loss of five American lives. The political
crisis this incident created between the United States and
17
For a blistering attack and many strong accusa-
tions against UNRRA and the people who worked for it, read
Pridonoff, Tito's Yugoslavia , especially pp. 103-4, 1928-
202, 214-224.
18The New York Times, May 12, 1946, p. 30.
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Yugoslavia will be discussed later. The threat to con-
tinued American contributions to UNRRA was immediate and
serious. American Legion chapters from all over the United
States sent resolutions of protest to Congress and to the
Department of State demanding cessation of UNRRA aid to
Yugoslavia. The Longshoreman's Union refused to load the
ships listed for Yugoslavia with UNRRA supplies. Even
children's groups sent protests.
Mr. La Guard ia was beset by problems: charges of
UNRRA mismanagement in Yugoslavia, the unpopular sentiment
Tito had caused through the just completed trial and execu-
tion of General Mihailovic, and the protests in light of the
loss of the two aircraft. He pleaded to the public to
understand that the UNRRA funds were not American controlled,
and therefore the United States had no authority to stop
19
shipment, whatever the cause.
La Guardia's plea did not decrease the pressure,
however, and it was not until the Acting Secretary of State,
William L. Clayton, came to the rescue that continued ship-
ment of the UNRRA supplies was assured. On September 12,
Mr. Clayton announced that the United States would not stop
shipments of UNRRA supplies to Yugoslavia in retaliation
for the shootdown. He made the announcement, he explained,
19Ibid. , August 30, 1946, p. 3
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in recognition of widespread demands In the country that
shipment be stopped immediately. Any retaliation on the
part of the United States, even though the Yugoslav be-
havior was inexcusable, "would be a violation of the obli-
gations we assumed when we agreed to participate in UNRRA.
American demands in regard to the shooting down of ouj
20
aviators have been largely met." The abuse subsided, but
the incident was not forgotten.
American interest in UNRRA had begun to flag. At
the fifth council session of UNRRA, Mr. La Guardia's recom-
mendation that European relief begin liquidation about
October 1, 1946, brought cries of protest from Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, and others. They
pleaded for continuation until the organization's responsi-
bilities could be taken over by the United Nations and
21
other bodies. In this same vein, the former head of
UNRRA, Governor Lehman cautioned:
If UNRRA is discontinued before provision is
made by the United Nations to carry on the work,
chaotic conditions are bound to ensue which will
wipe out much of the noteworthy gains made by
UNRRA during its three years of operation. 22
The United States, for one, was very anxious to see the





Tht! New York Times, August 4, 1946, p. 1.
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complicated financial and political responsibilities of
UNRRA taken over by the United Nations.
The United Nations, in its turn, designated a sub-
commission for economic reconstruction of devastated areas
to send field teams to investigate the various aspects of
UNRRA. The field team that went to Yugoslavia reported
that country as "well on the road to recovery." Their report
continued: "UNRRA relief has been of vital importance, and
wherever the sub-commision went they saw UNRRA locomotives,
23trucks, and farm equipment." In October, the United
Nations began its considerations on how best to absorb the
UNRRA operations.
Mr. La Guardia had also sent an UNRRA team to Yugo-
slavia to investigate the many charges. Their report of no
serious defects in the handling of relief was met by cries
24
of "whitewash" from UNRRA critics. La Guardia was tired
of all the abuse and announced his pending resignation.
The funds appropriated for UNRRA kept supplies on
their way to Yugoslavia until well into 1947. Marshal Tito
25properly expressed his gratitude for the aid, and the
23
The New York Times , September 13, 1946, p. 16.
24Ibid. , October 16, 1946, p. 13.
25Letter from Tito to La Guardia in connection with
the third anniversary of UNRRA, The New York Times , November
11, 1946, p. 3.
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United States made no attempt to interfere with delivery.
Yet relations between the two countries became very
strained during this period. C. L. Sulzberger, making a
tour through Yugoslavia in October and November, 1946,
reported that the people held UNRRA and the United States
in highest esteem. On the other hand, the official Yugo-
slav attitude was one of increasing antagonism.
It has been said that the Department of State's
postwar interest in Yugoslavia was due in considerable part
to the American participation in UNRRA. This same statement
may also be made in regard to the Congress of the United
States. For it was because of congressional pressure that
UNRRA came to an end. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
explained
:
We did not try to extend the life of UNRRA because
it was decided that, instead of other governments
allocating funds appropriated by us for relief, the
United States should make the allocation. 27
President Roosevelt and the Department of State were at
odds with Congress from the very inception of the idea of
UNRRA in 1942. Congressional leaders insisted that forma-
tion of such an agency must necessarily receive the
The New York Times , November 13, 1946, p. 13.
27James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 307.
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approval of Congress. After the President's 1944 message
to Congress, Representative Paul W. Shafer of Michigan
accused the Administration of:
. . . an attempt to push our Nation, under dis-
guise, further into the field of international
bribery. Under the guise of humanitarian impulses,
this proposal (.appropriation for $1,350,000,000]
will entangle us in the maze of petty political
sguabbles of every nation in the world • ... If
it is the will of Congress and of our people to
spend money to help those left in distress in the
wake of this horrible war, let us stand on our own
two feet and do it ourselves.
Representative Shafer went on to predict that: "Within one
year this world W.P.A. will be riddled with waste, ineffi-
28
ciency and scandal."
Despite some congressional opposition, once the
agency was approved, Congress maintained a close surveil-
lance over appropriations for UNRRA and distribution of
UNRRA supplies. Following the end of the war, Congress
tended more and more to specify what countries and areas
should receive what percentages of the relief funds; and
they even went so far as to place a time limit on American
29participation. When Congress specified that American
citizens should supervise and control the aid expenditures
28Congressional Record , Vol. XC (Washington:
Government Printing Office), p. A39 3.
For a compi Lntion of congressional opinj >ns about
UNRRA, see Congressional Record , Vol. XCII, pp. 7745-7752.
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in every country, the United States could no longer be a
viable part of UNRRA. As Dean Acheson said:
The people of the United States and the Congress
of the United States have made up their minds that
the relief problems of the near future are not of a
character which would warrant grants of enormous
sums of money for the United States Treasury under
conditions which would leave little or no effective
control by the grantor of these funds. ^0
Yugoslavia had received more than 14 per cent of
UNRRA* s entire budget, some $435,000,000 worth of assist-
ance. The United States had contributed 72 per cent of
31that budget. Millions of Yugoslav lives were saved by
the relief provided by UNRRA. And yet, relations between
the United States and Yugoslavia were at their lowest ebb
in history. A special request for additional aid made
directly to the United States by Yugoslavia in the spring
32
of 1947 was flatly rejected. The United States no longer
felt quite so generous toward Yugoslavia. Although the
two countries were in constant communications, both were
moving cautiously.
30"Bulletin , Vol. XV (1946), p. 1108.
31
Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956),
p. 323.
32Bulletin, Vol. XVI (1947), pp. 585-586.

CHAPTER IV
WARTIME ADMIRATION TURNS TO
PEACETIME ANTAGONISM
Of the many areas of official and unofficial contact
between Yugoslavia and the United States during 1946, the
three most explosive issues were the aforementioned arrest,
trial, and execution of General Draza Mihailovic; the loss
of two unarmed American military aircraft to Yugoslav
fighter planes; and the Yugoslav demands in the Trieste
area. The Mihailovic tragedy and the aircraft incident
brought forth a torrent of public expressions of opinion by
the American people, the vast majority of which were ex-
tensively anti-Yugoslavian. Administration officials
within the United States were hard pressed to maintain a
balanced and objective policy towards Yugoslavia under
these trying circumstances both because of the public and
congressional outcries and because of the growing antipathy
of the Yugoslav Government towards the United States.
I. MIHAILOVIC
As far as most of the American public was concerned,
General Draza Mihailovic wore the mantle of a hero as
early as 1942. His gallant £etnici had even received the
glorified publicity of a Hollywood movie. It had been
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Mihailovic's role to take command of those Yugoslavs, mili-
tary and civilian, who had taken to the hills and woods
when Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis. King Peter, in
exile in London, in recognition of Mihailovic's deeds,
appointed him a General and the Minister of War for the
Royal Yugoslav Government, Shortly after Hitler's forces
attacked the Soviet Union, the Cetnici were joined in their
insurgency by the Partisans of Josip Broz-Tito. Unfor-
tunately, due to political and ethnic factors the two
Yugoslav forces could not continue combined operations; and
for the remainder of the war they were constantly fighting
each other.
Mihailovic's image began to dim when the British
Government decided to back Tito's Partisans. A constant
barrage of pro-Tito propaganda followed that left both the
British and American public confused. Robert Wolff says
that Mihailovic's glorification had been due mainly to the
pro-Serb faction of the Yugoslavs in exile and did not
2
represent the feelings of the majority of Yugoslavians.
Tito sought an alliance with Mihailovic which would
have meant joint operations, a joint command, and even the
creation of provisional authorities to consist of represen-
tatives of all political groups which were willing to fight
the invaders. Presumably, because of his loathing for com-
munism, Mihailovic refused, Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans










Dr. Zalar did not take such a harsh viewpoint, but admitted
to a naive Mihailovic:
Mihailovic was not a politician. He was a Serbian
patriot, and, as an officer, devoted to the King.
He depended on political advisers, all of whom,
domestic and foreign, failed him terribly.
3
Mihailovic lost the support of the Allies at a time
when that support meant an increasing amount of guns and
ammunition supplied by Great Britain and the United States.
Almost all of the arms went to the Partisans, thus increas-
Jng Tito's effectiveness against the Cetnici as well as the
Nazis. The propaganda that reached the United States
stressed that Mihailovic was doing nothing and only the
Partisans were fighting the Axis forces. Since access to
accurate reports was extremely hazardous, the communiques
of the two Yugoslav units had to be evaluated by the Ameri-
can and British radio stations and relayed to the public as
those stations saw fit. The Partisans gained the majority
of supporters, according to many bitter critics of the
Allied pro-Tito position, because of influential left-wing
officials in the Western governments. However, Mihailovic
3United States Congress, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Yugoslav Communism : A Critical Study , ed.







never lost the strong backing of the Serbian population in
the United States.
When the war in Europe ended, Mihailovic was driven
into hiding in the mountains of Bosnia where he eluded his
Partisan pursuers for almost a year. While he hid in Yugo-
slavia, his followers were still active. Tito, upon assum-
ing control of all Yugoslavia in April, 1945, sent Dr.
Subasic to San Francisco as the head of the Yugoslav dele-
gation to the United Nations Conference. This delegation
was challenged by Mihailovic' s Serbian-American followers
—
the Serbian National Federation of America—who presented
to the conference a message from the General calling for
United Nations backing for a coalition government in Yugo-
slavia. Subasic 1 s reply was that Mihailovic would be
tried and shot as a traitor because of his collaboration
with the Germans. No move was made by the conference to
seat the Mihailovic backers.
It was not until March 13, 1946, that Tito's forces
finally hunted down General Mihailovic, finding him in a
Bosnian cave with but eleven of his fellow Cetnici from a
force that numbered over 200,000 in the early days of the
5The New York Times , May 1, 1945, p. 13.




war.' Within three months, Mihailovic was in the midst of
a trial for which the verdict had already been reached.
The United States initiated the exchange of many-
notes with Yugoslavia throughout the spring, most of which
concerned two official Washington requests that American
airmen who had been rescued by the Cetnici be allowed to
testify for Mihailovic at the trial. The wartime Yugoslav
Ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Fotic, claimed
that there were some 520 airmen rescued. The Yugoslav
Government answered the first American note by saying "no"
to the testimony. They also denied that saving the airmen
was an heroic and patriotic act, accusing Mihailovic of
Q
doing so in the hope of gaining increased Allied aid.
When the United States repeated its request, the Yugoslavs
declined any official reply. To the press, General Alek-
sandar Rankovic, the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior (and
head of the Secret Police), accused the United States of
9
attempting to interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.
Many groups, including former officials of the Royal
Yugoslav Government in exile, the National Committee of
7
Ibid ., March 25, 1946, p. 1.
8Bulletin
,
Vol. XIV (1946), pp. 634 and 669.
9
The New York Times, May 4, 1946, p. 4.
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American Airmen to aid General Mihailovic and the Serbian
People, the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draza Mihailovic,
and a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the U. S.
Congress, as well as numerous editorials called for a United
Nations sponsored international tribunal to assure the
world that General Mihailovic would receive a fair and im-
partial trial. Such a trial, it was claimed, could not be
expected under the Tito regime.
The trial began on the tenth of June, 1946, and the
judges found Draza Mihailovic guilty as charged on July
fifteenth. The General was executed by firing squad on the
morning of July eighteenth. Requests for clemency, coming
from all over the world, were refused. The United States
Department of State, however, made no move for clemency or
12to prevent the execution. The Yugoslavs and the world
have remained divided in their opinions of Mihailovic 's
wartime actions. The evidence at his trial was overwhelming
in its grounds for condemnation. Can it be believed.'
This claim is mentioned often in The New York
Times (March 27, April 30, June 1, June 10, 1946)
.""
Before his capture, Mihailovic had refused Ameri-
can offers to aid his escape to Italy. Constantin Fotitch,
The War We Lost (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 284.




The postwar American Air Transport Service flights
between Vienna and Rome were breathtaking on clear days.
But on those days when the weather was perverse, these
flights over the Carinthian Alps were very difficult and
hazardous. The few available radio aids to navigation were
often unreliable. The safest path was to cut across the
northwest corner of Yugoslavia on a direct line between two
flight check points: Klagenfurt, Austria, and Udine, Italy.
There the mountain passes were not quite so high and visual
reference to the ground was easier to obtain. The Yugoslav
Government, after repeated instances of American planes
using this shortcut through Yugoslavia, officially re-
quested that the Americans desist from their intrusion upon
Yugoslav sovereignty. The American pilots were duly cau-
tioned to remain clear of Yugoslav territory.
On August 9, 1946, an American C-47 transport,
either taking the shortcut or lost in the clouds, was
forced down in a corn field near Ljubljana. Fortunately,
only one passenger was injured. The occupants were taken
to Belgrade and not allowed to contact the American Embassy.
This incident was a climax to a long series of inci-
dents, each of which had increased the diplomatic tension
between the United States and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia

60
formally accused the United States and others of willful
violation of sovereign Yugoslav airspace. The United
States immediately blamed the incident on bad weather and
13the pitfalls of mountain flying.
Despite American demands that the fliers be returned,
no contact was made with the crew for over a week after the
crash. The American Embassy was assured that the crew was
alive and well. Yugoslavia claimed the plane was signaled
to land; and when the pilot refused, the plane was forced
down. Washington could not make any excuses until the
pilot was allowed to tell his story.
On August 20, another American C-47 disappeared
while enroute from Vienna to Udine. Radio transmissions
indicated that the plane was being fired upon and finally
shot down by Yugoslav planes and anti-aircraft guns. The
bodies of the five American airmen were found five days
later.
This time the Department of State was quick to
accuse Yugoslavia of unwarranted action on the part of a
14
supposedly friendly nation. The charges intimated that
Tito was waging a war of nerves connected to the Trieste
13The New York Times
,
August 32, 1946, p. 1.




negotiations then in progress. Tit', answered by accusing
the United States of sending whole squadrons of military
planes over Yugoslavia. He further stated that in this
particular case, the pilot, after crossing the border,
ignored the interceptors' signals to land, a direct in-
fringement of Yugoslavia's sovereignty; and, therefore, the
Yugoslav fighters were acting in normal defense of their
L . 17frontier.
The American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, was
in Paris for the peace negotiations at this time. He de-
manded to know the circumstances of the shooting and
received what he considered a very unsatisfactory reply
from the Yugoslavs. He immediately issued
instructions to notify the Yugoslavs that unless
we received a satisfactory reply to our demands
within forty-eight hours we would call upon the
United Nations Security Council to take appropri-
ate action. 18
As the Department of State had declared that the
United States considered the Yugoslav action to be a
19threat to world peace and no longer to be tolerated, and
15 The New York Times , August 20, 1946, p. 1.
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 145.
17Bulletin , Vol. XV (1946), p. 418.
18Byrnes, op_. cit
. ,
p. 145. For the United States
note, see Bulletin , Vol. XV (1946), p. 418.
The New York Times, August 22, 1946, p. 1.
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had admitted that there were no effective sanctions that
20the United States itself might apply against Yugoslavia,
it seemed appropriate for the United States to turn to the
U.N. Security Council for satisfaction. However, Tito re-
acted quickly by freeing the captive fliers. He also
stated that he deplored the loss of lives and had now given




under any circumstances. To Secretary Byr , this was
the essential part of a "satisfactory reply.
Despite the disillusioned protests of many Americans,
the Department of State approached the two incidents real-
istically. On August 30, the Acting Secretary of State,
William Clayton, announced that the United States would
claim indemnity for the loss of life and damages sustained
23in the two air attacks. The indemnity figure was sub-




, August 21, 1946, p. 2.
21Bulletin , Vol. XV (1946), p. 418.
22
'Byrnes, o£. cit .
,
p. 145. Secretary Byrnes seemed
convinced that the Russians had put significant pressure on
the Yugoslavs to ease the great tension that pervaded the
peace conference after the American ultimatum. Secretary
Byrnes also admits that this incident turned him against








and accepted by the Yugoslav Government. Although tl
payments were slow in coming, official satisfaction had
been accomplished.
Still, behind the provocative incidents lay the
question of just why Tito had ordered the attacks. Tito
claimed that the United States planes were, in reality,
reconnoitering the Yugoslav moves in his zone of the
25Venez La Giulia area. Eric Pridonoff denies that the at-
tacks had any military significance, but believes they were
"significant politically." According to Mr. Pridonoff:
Tito was demonstrating to his secret enemies
throughout Yugoslavia, especially in pro-American
democratic Serbia, that he was able to defy the
one great democratic power in whom their hopes
rested. If he could kill American fliers with
impunity, how could democratic Yugoslavs expect
succor from America?26
The United States Congress had adjourned on August 3
that year, so there were no significant comments from that
august body about how the Department of State should handle
the diplomatic problems involved. Senators Connally and
Vandenberg, however, were with Secretary of State Byrnes
at the peace conference in Paris and were kept constantly
" 4 The New York Times
,
August 31, 1946, p. 1.
25Ibid
.
, August 25, 1946, p. 1.
26
Eric L. Pridonoff, Tito's Yugoslavia (Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 236-237.
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27informed of the progress of the United States protests.
The incidents were handled firmly, and the form of the pro-
test showed that the United States was anxious to use the
newly-established organs of international security. Ameri-
can public opinion, on the other hand, was increasing!"
stirred when this unprovoked attack was added to the deep
feeling generated by General Mihailovic's trial and Yugo-
slavia's warlike behavior over Trieste.
III. TRIESTE
Trieste was once the principal port of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Its population was mainly Italian, while
in the villages surrounding the port, the Slovenes pre-
dominated. The controversy between Italy and Yugoslavia
over the Venezia Giulia and Trieste had its roots in many
years of conflict before World War II. As the Partisan?
began their successful compaiqn to drive the Germans from
Yugoslavia, Tito felt the time had arrived to claim the
disputed area for good. The Partisans wanted to be the
first in the area so that the right of conquest could be
28
added to Yugoslavia's claims. The Allied forces thwarted
2 7
•tary Byrnes was most appreciative of the bi-
partisan help provided by the two senators during the pea< e
conf erences . Byrnes, op_. cit .
, pp. 234-236,
28At the same session of the AVNOJ in 1943, where
Tito was proclaimed Marshal of Yugoslavia, the provisional
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this plan by moving into the area at the same time as the
Partisans, Yugoslavia considered her claim to annexation as
internationally binding and the Allied forces as intruders.
May, 1945, was the most critical month because the
United States was convinced that the settlement of the
territory should only be by negotiation. Acting Secretary
of State Joseph Grew said:
. . . it was decided that the best way to avoid
hasty and precarious territorial solutions in the
Anglo-American theater of operations would be to
establish and maintain an Allied Military Govern-
ment in the disputed areas [northeastern frontier
of Italy J pending settlement by the orderly
processes to which the United Nations were
pledged. 29
Because both the Americans and the British stood firm, and
because Tito could not get the backing he expected from the
Soviet Union, a provisional agreement was reached in June,
1945, dividing the Allied and Yugoslav armies by what came
30
to be known as the "Morgan Line."
Numerous frontier incidents followed about which
many diplomatic notes were exchanged; and by the summer of
parliament also solemnly declared the Venezia Giulia annexed
to Yugoslavia. Hugh Seton-Watson, East European Revolution
(London: Methuen and Company, 1952"5~J p. 348.
29Bulletin
,
Vol. XII (1945), p. 902.
30
Ibid
. , p. 1050. The Morgan Line was uamrd aft<
the Brit Lsh General Morgan who was chiei oi the Allied
General Staff in the Mediterranean.
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]946, actual troop clashes took place along the Morgan
Line. To add to the confusion, the very strong Italian
Communist Party, torn between wanting to belong to a com-
munist state and desiring to stay in Italy, promoted
strikes and demonstrations against the Allied control.
Secretary Byrnes felt that the Trieste settlement
was one of the three essential issues faced at the Paris
Conference of Foreign Ministers during the summer of
311946. The leading figure among the United States dele-
gates opposing the Yugoslavia takeover in Trieste seems to
have been Senator Tom Connally. Senator Connally felt very
strongly that the Trieste area should become the responsi-
bility of the United Nations Security Council:
The territory of Trieste must not remain as a
danger spot. It must not become the center of
irritation and intrigue which may disturb the
peace of the world. It must be absolutely inde-
pendent. Its integrity and dignity must be
secured. We are not here to serve the interests
of Yugoslavia or the interests of Italy. Yugo-
slavia and Italy are both subordinate to the
peace of the area and to the peace of the world. 32
The way out was found by following a suggestion of
the French delegation and acclaiming Trieste a free terri-
tory. By the peace treaty with Italy, signed in February,
31 Byrnes, op_. cit .
,
p. 147.
32Bulletin, Vol. XV (1946), p. 571.
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1947, the greater part of Venezia Giulia went to Yugo-
slavia. The United Nations Security Council assumed formal
responsibility for the Free Territory of Trieste; but ef-
forts of the Security Council to elect a governor failed
because of the Russian veto. Most of the problems between
Italy and Yugoslavia were left unsolved. The governor
issue was considered critical by the Western Powers because
that office was to represent the Security Council and have
considerable powers to control the police, to maintain
order, to declare a state of siege, and to protect human
rights. The Russians preferred a governor with little
authority. They also envisioned a Trieste with close ties
to Yugoslavia. Secretary of State Byrnes objected to the
Russian attitude by saying:
We were determined to do our utmost to protect
the area from infiltration and similar tactics that
would pave the way for a coup aimed at delivering
Trieste to Yugoslavia, as Danzig had been delivered
to Germany. 3 3
Robert Wolff claimed that the Yugoslavs were angry
and frustrated not only because they were thwarted by the
great power decisions in Trieste, but also because the
Russians had not continued to support the Yugoslav claims
34
to the very end. Tito, according to Hamilton Fish









Armstrong, had traveled to Moscow to ask Stalin whether he
was willing to go to war to gain Trieste for Yugoslavia.
Stalin's reproach for even suggesting such a plan was a
. . 35humiliating setback for Tito. Thus, another seed of dis-
cord appeared to disillusion the Yugoslavs.
The Yugoslav Government cooperated in the Trieste
area only as much as was absolutely necessary because Yugo-
slavia was not strong enough to ignore the Western pressure.
But peaceful settlement would not come to Venezia Giulia
for many years; and the clash of troops and diplomatic
notes of criticism would continue to keep the United States
and Yugoslavia constantly at odds until the political at-
mosphere changed so dramatically in 1948.
IV. OTHER IRRITANTS
There were other causes of friction between the
United States and Yugoslavia in those first years following
World War II. One particular situation that received wide-
spread publicity in the United States was the arrest and
trial of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, Aloj?;ije
Stepinac, for alleged collaboration with the Germans and
the Yugoslav puppet government—the Ustasa. The trial
35Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 53.
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during October, 1946, brought forth vehement protests from
many church groups all over the world, Robert Wolff has
said that the Tito regime found the strong public opinion
aroused by Stepinac's sixteen years at hard labor sentence
36
was a definite embarrassment to relations with the West.
The many requests from the American public to the Depart-
ment of State to do something concrete about this denial of
freedom of religion brought forth a very guarded reply from
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson:
It is the civil liberties aspect of the thing
which causes us concern: aspects which raise ques-
tions as to whether the trial has any implications
looking toward the impairment of freedom of religion
and of worship; the aspects of it which indicate at
least to the reporters who reported it from the spot
that the actual conduct of the trial left a great
deal to be desired.-* 7
This was the only official statement made by the United
States Government. The United States apparently sought
political expediency in circumventing this obvious in-
ternal Yugoslav conflict by all but ignoring Stepinac's
plight. The Yugoslav Government sought Stepinac's condem-
nation as a definite political expediency.
The Archbishop became, to the outside world, a
symbol of the invincibility of idealistic philosophy and of
Wolff, ojD. cit . , p. 557.
37Bulletin, Vol. XV (1946), p. 725.
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Christian martyrdom. This the Yugoslav Government did not
want. The Archbishop was later released because of illness
and lived out his life in his native village of Kra'Sic.
Another problem in United States-Yugoslav relations
was the situation of American citizens in Yugoslavia. Fol-
lowing the war, there were from five hundred to twenty-five
hundred United States citizens in Yugoslavia that, accord-
ing to the Department of State, were being prevented from
communicating with the American Embassy in Belgrade. In an
exchange of diplomatic notes between the two governments,
the United States accused Yugoslavia of: (1) in certain
cases, depriving these American citizens of their identifi-
cation papers; and (2) employing some U. S. nationals "at
38forced labor." As no exact count of those affected was
available, the Department of State appealed to the American
populace of Yugoslav descent to report the names of any
relatives or friends with American citizenship they knew
who were being prevented from leaving Yugoslavia. The
appeal and the diplomatic notes had minimal effect; some of
those who were allowed to leave Yugoslavia were returned to
39the United States on empty UNRRA ships.










United States Information Service in Belgrade in the fall
of 1946. The Yugoslav charge was that the U.S.I.S. served
to conduct a continuing campaign against the Yugoslav
Government. Beyond this charge seems to have been a par-
ticular annoyance at the publication in Belgrade of a
series of articles by the former economic specialist in
the American Embassy in Yugoslavia, Eric Pridonoff. The
articles, very critical of the Tito regime (as well as the
handling of TTNRRA supplies in Yugoslavia), had first ap-
peared in the Los Angeles Examiner during the summer of
1946. The American Embassy denied complicity in the publi-
cation of the articles in Belgrade but could not deny Yugo-
slavia's reguest that the U.S.I.S. be closed. Ambassador
Patterson expressed his regrets over the closing, saying:
"It was a service and a mental refreshment which Yugoslavs
wanted and are now denied." The United States made
determined efforts to have the U.S.I.S. reopened but met
with little success until 1948.

CHAPTER V
THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMINFORM BREAK
On June 28, 1948, the Communist Information Bureau
(Cominform) released the resolution of eight of its com-
munist party members condemning the leaders of the "turkish
terrorist regime" of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
(CPY) and expelling Yugoslavia from Cominform membership.
Tito, Edvard Kardelj (the leading CPY theorist), Milovan
Djilas (chief propagandist), and Rankovic were accused of
"pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and
the CPSU(B)," of "breaking with the Marxist theory of
classes and class struggle," and of "revision the Marxist-
Leninist teachings about the Party."
On the next day, Western newspapers filled their
front pages with the Cominform charges and their own specu-
lation as to how deep the apparent ideological problem and
political rift would be. The news was so spectacular that
it overshadowed the beginnings of American and British
efforts to feed West Berlin by air—the Berlin Airlift.
The Cominform' s charges of Yugoslav pursuit of a hateful
and slanderous policy toward the Soviet Union and leaning
The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Text of the Published
Correspondence), "Com Inform" Communl que" (London: val
Institute of Internationa] Affairs, L948), p. 62.
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toward Western methods were generally interpreted as being
related to the impact of the United States instigated
Marshall Plan. The speculations were cautious in tone.
The New York Times saw the Cominform action as no complete
reversal of the Yugoslav position on essential domestic and
foreign policies, but rather as "a split of historic im-
2portance in the Communist front."
James Reston reported from Washington:
The tendency in the capital is not to make too
much now of the Tito incident. What the incident has
done, however, is to confirm a belief of the leaders
of both parties that the policy of economic and
political assistance to Western and Southern Europe,
and of stern resistance to Soviet pressure is the
right one and is showing results.^
On this, the first day after the news, Washington officials
had nothing to say on the matter.
Some Western experts on Soviet affairs took it for
granted that Moscow's authority would prevail. The Comin-
form resolution had called upon the "healthy elements" of
the CPY "to compel their present leaders to recognize their
mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them," or, if
they would not, "to replace them." It came as an even
greater surprise then that the very next day the Yugoslavs
threw a defiant reply back to the Cominform. It was






generally concluded in the press that the issue was of
great consequence and had the appearance of much more than
a Party being chastized for a small deviation. In effect,
the Yugoslav denial of any deviation was an announcement
that Yugoslavia and the Cominform were throuqh. Tito had
broken with Russia.
Although the American public was taken by surprise
by the news of the rift between the Soviets and their once
most loyal followers, the declaration of the Cominform con-
firmed the suspicions of many observers of Yugoslav and
Eastern European affairs. The Belgrade May Day parade,
just two months before, was conspicuous because of the
scarcity and the small size of the pictures of Stalin. In
contrast, portraits of Tito were overwhelming in number and
size. Five days later came the announcement that two of
Tito's former ministers, Andrija Hebrang and Sretan Zujovic,
had been dismissed. As any changes in the ministry of such
a government as Yugoslavia means some type of internal
problems, the correspondents' curiosity was aroused.
The first indication of trouble that appeared in the
American press was apparently in an article forwarded from
London by Herbert L. Matthews the day before the public
announcement by the Cominform. Mr. Matthews, in an offhand
way while writing of the crisis over Berlin, said:
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Incidently there have been persistent rumors in
London of dissension among the Communist leaders
of the satellite countries and Moscow. Reports
especially center on Yugoslav Premier Marshal Tito,
who is said to be too independent for Moscow's
satisfaction.
The main source of these rumors turned out to be the June
fifteenth issue of the Cominform organ "For a Lasting Peace,
For a People's Democracy," in which, without naming names,
much criticism was laid to independent attitudes among cer-
5tain satellite leaders.
From the day of the announcement, there was some
speculation as to whether American and British officials
were really surprised at the communist split. One writer
asked if it was not "legitimate to wonder if Marshal Tito
has not already received promises of support whether he
sought them or not." The only reaction that the Depart-
ment of State would express was that they were watching
7developments very closely. This was quite an under-
statement.
The United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Cavendish
W. Cannon, was not quite so discreet in his statement to
4The New York Times , June 27, 1948, p. 3.
For a Lasting Peace , For _a People' s Democracy
[BelgradeTT June 1 5 > 1948.
6The New York Times , June 29, 1948, p. 9.
7Ibid. , June 30, 1948, p. 3.
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the press one week after the Cominform announcement. Am-
bassador Cannon had relieved Richard Patterson in the
spring of 1947, so he had had a year to observe Yugoslavia
and its foreign relations. The Ambassador was traveling in
Italy on June 28 and found himself called to Washington
shortly thereafter. On his way to Washington, he told the
press: "We saw it was more or less coming; there was ten-
sion in the air and great excitement in the Communist Party
and obvious friction with Moscow." On July 12, Ambassador
Cannon was called in to brief President Truman. His only
comments on the United States position after his meeting
with the President were: "After all there is a communist
regime in Yugoslavia in any case." Then he added: "The
United States has a lot of friends among the people of
9Yugoslavia.
"
The United States had already made one move toward
easing the tension with Yugoslavia. On July 1, it was
announced that the $47,000,000 in gold which had been
deposited for safekeeping by the Royal Yugoslav Government
in the United States in 1941 was going to be released to
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government, in return, was going
to settle United States claims over private property,
8The New York Times , July 7, 1948, p. 5.
9
rbid. , July L3, 1948, p, L8.
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pre-UNRRA loans and other monetary problems between the two
nations. American officials stressed, however, that the
timing of the announcement had "no bearing whatever" on
Yugoslavia's quarrel with Moscow.
Yugoslavia, now more desperately in need of capital
than ever, had been agitating for the return of the gold
since 1945. The only answer the United States ever gave to
Yugoslav requests was that the gold was being held in com-
pensation for the American claims against Yugoslavia. On
January 2, 1948, Yugoslavia had decided to put pressure on
the United States by appealing to the forum of an appropri-
ate agency of the United Nations. The Yugoslav Ambassador
to the United States presented a note to the Department of
State demanding the release of the gold:
Further delay in the unfreezing of these reserves,
under whatever pretext, can be interpreted only as
an intention to obstruct the economic reconstruction
of Yugoslavia and to hinder her participation in the
reconstruction of European economy, thus hampering
the reconstruction of Europe in general.
I
1
The Ambassador added that the matter was being placed on
the agenda of the United Nations Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC).
The United States was rather doubtful that either
the improvement or the deterioration of the Yugoslav
10The New York Times
, July 1, 1948, p. 1
L1Bulletin, Vol. xvttt (1948). p. 119.
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economy could have a significant effect on the rest of
Europe. But in calling upon ECOSOC, Yugoslavia touched a
tender American nerve. Official American policy was to use
the United Nations as much as possible to insure that inter-
national body's vitality. In so doing, the United States
faced a variety of opinions not always amenable to the
American position. Even though the United States delegates
felt certain that ECOSOC 1 s power was limited to an advisory
capacity, the use of such a forum by the Yugoslavs could be
detrimental to United States prestige. Secretary of State
George C. Marshall refused to be intimidated by Yugo-
slavia's maneuver, deciding that Yugoslavia could not pre-
12
sent a sufficiently strong case (or gather sufficient
strength among the membership of the Council).
The United States argument, when the matter was
brought before the Council in February, 1948, was as ex-
pected. ECOSOC was not a court of appeal and, therefore,
not a proper body to take up the item. Graciously, the
United States added that it had no formal objection to the
13discussion of the Yugoslav gold. The Russian delegate
suggested that the matter would more properly be brought
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but this
2Bulletin
,
Vol. XVIII (1948), pp. 117-118.
13The Mew York Times, February 3, 1948, p. 6.
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suggestion received no support from either contesting
state. On March 9, the Council, supporting the United
States position, refused to consider the matter on pro-
cedural grounds.
By the time of the ECOSOC refusal, Yugoslavia began
to feel the strain of the mountain problems with the Soviet
Union, and began serious negotiations with the U. S. State
Department. The agreement was signed on July 19, just
three weeks after the Cominform break. Again, the Depart-
ment of State felt obliged to mention that the Yugoslav-
Cominform guarrel had nothing to do with the settlement.
This may very well be true, but the conflict between the
two communist nations certainly eased the problem of nego-
tiation for the United States. Yugoslavia was facing
isolation and needed, if not friendship, at least a lessen-
ing degree of animosity.
It is ironic that the background and the official
correspondence of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute is more well-
known than the initial attitude of the United States toward
that dispute. Circumstances were such that Yugoslavia was
anxious for the people to know the Russian charges in order
to see how "inaccurate and unfounded" these assertions
1 The New York Times
,
March 10, 1948, p. 4.




were, and to "prevent confusion amongst the masses in the
16
country and in the international workers' movement."
Therefore, almost all the correspondence, six of the eight
known letters between the Central Committee of the CPY and
the Central Committee of the CPSU, were published for all
to read. Thi c~ unexpected and bold reaction by Yugoslavia
forced the U.S.S.R. to defend its charges through much
deeper public analysis than the Soviets were accustomed.
The letters reveal that what started out to be a
father-son lecture on personal habits that were unaccept-
able became an ideological harangue that the Soviets could
not tolerate because it was not one sided.
Most observers, however, saw the rift as a truly
personal antagonism between Stalin and Tito, rather than a
nation-wide antagonism toward the USSR. The fact that Tito
was a "self-made man" who had not been elevated to his
position by Moscow, as had the other satellite leaders, had
17
not endeared him to Stalin. When Tito and Kardelj in-
cluded in their letter to the CPSU on April 13 that "no
matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the
U.S.S.R., he can, in no case, love his country less," and
"we are developing socialism in our country in somewhat
-I c
The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute
, op. cit . , p. 73.
17The New York Times, June 30, 1948, p. 1.
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different forms," Stalin countered with grave charges of
18
nationalism. Since this same charge was leveled later at
the Yugoslav leaders by the Cominform, Tito felt obliged to
mention it in his June 29 reply to the Cominform resolution:
The CC of the CPY resolutely rejects the accusa-
tion that the CPY has passed on to positions of
nationalism. By its entire internal and foreign
policy, and especially by its struggle during the
national liberation war and the proper solution of
the national question in Yugoslavia, the CPY has
given proof of the exact opposite. -^
Tito's challenge to the Kremlin's ability to claim unique
and universal authority forced Stalin to ostracize Yugo-
slavia as long as Tito remained in power.
Despite the many ideological aspects that the Soviet
charges attest to, a very real issue was what Josef Korbel
called "psychological":
Moscow failed to understand that Marshal Tito,
Prime Minister of the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav
Army, Partisan leader, national hero and dictator,
was a different person from Josep Broz, once under-
ground agent of the Third International. ^0
Stalin had attacked one of Yugoslavia's most precious be-
longings, its Army. The Partisans' arduous fighting had by
18The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute , op . c_it. ,pp. 27, 52.
19 TbicU
, p. 78.
20Josef Korbel, Tito's Communism (Denver: University
of Denver Press, 1951), p. 300.
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now turned into a living legend. It is possible that the
great pride of the Partisans had grown into actual conceit
mixed with scorn for the achievements of the other commu-
nist parties in Europe. It may have been this same
Partisan background and Partisan mentality more than
nationalism, which triggered the Yugoslav defiance.
Stalin claimed that the Red Army had saved the Par-
tisans from annihilation. Such a statement immediately
assured Tito of the support of all those Partisans who
might have been hesitating over the conflict. Stalin's
statement was the climax to what Tito felt was a deliberate
Soviet attempt to take command of the Yugoslav Army. Much
of this was discussed in the exchange of letters. What was
not discussed was the Yugoslav disgust with the actions of
the Soviet Army from the day it swept into eastern Yugo-
slavia. According to Dr. Zalar, the Soviet troops behaved
in exactly the same manner as they did in enemy territory.
They displayed what he calls "the characteristics of a
savage army; mass rapes, robberies, attacks on civilians,
21
and other such acts." Later, as the Soviet troops with-
drew from Yugoslavia, they "raped the countryside," ab-
sconding with livestock, machinery and agricultural
21
U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Yugoslav Communism : A Critical Study (Charles Zalar, ed.;
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 163.
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22products. This behavior, in a fashion supposedly re-
served for the enemy, caused acute embarrassment to Tito's
Government and was, therefore, not given much publicity.
Tito was fully aware that this Soviet attitude
assured him the support of the great majority of the Par-
tisans. He knew that the Soviets were extremely unpopular
among the non-communist element of the Yugoslav population.
He felt secure, at least internally, in his position in
opposition to the Cominform.
Tito's unwillingness to admit to the Soviet charges
and his determination not to give in to Stalin were summed
up in a nine-hour speech to the Fifth Congress of the Yugo-
slav Communist Party in late July, 1948. Toward the end of
the speech, Tito said:
In our foreign policy since the war we have gone
hand in hand all the way with the foreign policy of
the Soviet Union ... loyalty and solidarity with
the Soviet Union and all the other countries of
people's democracy on foreign policy questions ....
A terrible injustice is being done to us, that is to
our country, when we are accused of isolating our-
selves from the front of democracy. ^3
In this same speech, Tito again denied the charges of
nationalism. Indeed, his greatest claim to fame up to this
22These charges are prominent in the writings of Eric
Pridonoff, Tito's Yugoslavia , op . cit . , pp. 46-47, and 52;
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time may well have been that he had been able to keep the
divergent nationalities of Yugoslavia together. Few, if
any countries, have faced the multiple nationality problem
24
as well as has Yugoslavia under Tito.
As the final act of defiance to the Cominform, Tito,
Kardel j , Djilas, and Rankovic were all unanimously re-
elected to the positions of leadership by the Congress.
This act of unity within the CPY was a most convincing
manifestation and was certainly not lost on Stalin. The
path of resistance was set, and Yugoslavia was now obliged
to follow it.
It has already been noted that the United States
took little official notice of the ouster of Yugoslavia
from the Cominform other than admitting to v/atching the
evolution of this event very closely. Behind this usual
24 ~Contrary to the predominantly Serbian Cetnici of
General Mihailovic, the Partisans were well representative
of all the nationalities—including Serbian—of Yugoslavia.
Tito himself was considered a Croat, being born of a Croat
father and a Slovene mother. These two facts effectively
complemented his natural talents for leadership; and com-
bined with his much publicized role as the greatest hero of
the Partisans, gave Yugoslavia the sort of leader necessary
in such a heterogeneous nation. Despite the high esteem of
his people, Tito was very cautious when the final act of
Cominform drama was imminent. According to The New York
Times (July 1, 1948, p. 1), Tito had made no public
appearances after the May nay parade and left Belgrade for
one of the Adriatic islands In mid-June. Once lie was




cautious facade, there was, in fact, great interest. Be-
cause all of the official American documents and informa-
tion on this particular sequence of events are still
classified, and will remain so for at least five more years,
it is difficult to reconstruct just what did take place
within official circles in Washington. The writer is
forced, therefore, to resort to presumptions supported by
subsequent events in attempting to recreate the actions and
reactions of the United States.
The first presumption, and one fundamental to this
thesis, is that the Department of State immediately recog-
nized not only the reality and seriousness of the Yugoslav
break, but also its very importance to the United States
and the other Western nations. Because of the American
posture in the cold war, the ouster of Tito, the first
crack In the Soviet monolith, was of basic interest to the
United States.
According to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the first
significant report of the trouble between Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union to reach the Department of State was from
our Embassy in Belgrade. Two weeks before the Cominform
declaration, the American observers in Belgrade predicted
what would happen from "stray facts and keen hunches." Two
events in particular had caught the Embassy's eye: (1)
contrary to previous years, Tito did not receive a
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congratulatory birthday message from Stalin on May 25; and
(2) a difference of opinion developed between the Soviet
and Yugoslav Governments over the location of the Danube
25Conference scheduled for mid-summer. The Embassy had
also taken note of the other signs previously mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter.
Mr. Armstrong added that when the Department of
State checked this speculative report with the American
Embassy in Moscow, it was "laughed off" because "the sense
of Russian omnipotence was so strong that the idea of one
26
of Stalin's satraps daring to defy him seemed ridiculous.
"
Nevertheless, the Embassy report from Belgrade can be con-
sidered a model of diplomatic reporting.
Just how the Department of State immediately evalu-
ated the Belgrade Embassy report in the light of denials
from Moscow may never be publicly known; nor is it known
whether there were other reports that could convince the
United States officials of the accuracy of the American
Embassy's speculation. Yet the subsequent actions of the
Department of State indicate that, once the break was
affirmed by Tito's actions, the responsible officials felt
25Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New








that the break was genuine, that it could not be closed by
any conceivable compromise as long as Stalin was alive, and
that Tito would survive. This was in contrast to the many
pessimists among the press and in other American Embassies.
One semi-official notice was taken of the rift
within two weeks of the Cominform announcement. On the
same day that Ambassador Cannon was called into conference
with President Truman, the TJ. S. Government also released
the text of a Voice of America broadcast which dealt with
the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. The broadcast, transmitted in
every language of the Soviet bloc except Serbo-Croat,
pointed out that the Soviet-dominated Cominform was trying
to discipline Yugoslavia for perfecting the very techniques
invented by the Soviet regime. The Voice of America said:
"They [the Soviets] created a state so much in their own
image that they found they could neither penetrate it nor
27
control it, so they denounced it."
It can be presumed that President Truman took a deep
interest in the dispute; and at a time when the Democratic
Convention was taking place, a convention in which he faced
a serious southern revolt. Truman's action in calling a
conference to hear Ambassador Cannon's report, not just a
27As quoted in The New York Times




brief visit as was customary with returning Ambassadors,
indicates that the top officials were giving high priority
to reassessing the American position in regard to Yugo-
slavia. Perhaps there was no significance:, but on the day
following this conference, the United States announced that
the Free Territory of Trieste was being admitted to the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in
order to receive Marshall Plan aid. When querried whether
the Yugoslav section of the Trieste area would receive this
same aid, the OEEC officials admitted they had not even
28
considered that aspect of the aid, and had no answer.
The question that remained was how could such an
event as the dispute be advantageous to the United States?
As the Department of State records of this period are
classified, and as no responsible official has seen fit to
mention this era in detail in his memoirs, all that re-
mains is to speculate as to the considerations and the
actions proposed by the Department of State in this situa-
tion.
The events of June 28 and 29, 1948 were not the usual
type of events that officials in the Department of State
had been considering since the end of World War IT. In
fact, these events were unique Ln the relal L n: oi the
28
The Now York Times, July 14, 19-18, p. 11.
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Soviet Union to another communist state in Europe. The
American approach had to be plotted with great care.
It is safe to assume that the relative importance of
Tito's declaration of independence warranted the use of the
Department of State's newest addition, the Policy Planning
29Staff. By combining the expertise of that staff, at the
time headed by George Kennan, the former Ambassador to
Moscow, with the accumulative knowledge within the proper
operating bureau, the European bureau, position and policy
papers must have been prepared setting forth guidelines for
use not only in regard to Yugoslavia, but also in dealing
with any other Eastern European country that might follow
Yugoslavia's revisionist example.
Drawing from the now-proven reports of the U. S.
Embassy staff in Belgrade, the Policy Planning Staff and
the European bureau were assured that this was a serious
rift of profound implications. The next consideration
would have been what effect would this rift have on the
rest of the Soviet bloc. From the knowledge that was
available, it could be presumed that Stalin would be forced
to tighten the reins on the other communist parties
—
29The Policy Planning Staff had been created in 1947
as an integral part of the Department of State charged with
developing positions on those important questions con-
stantly plaguing U. S. foreign relations. It is now known
as the Policy Planning Council.
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parties who owed their position in power to Moscow. In
effect, Tito was going to be isolated from the bloc. The
very nature of the rift precluded any settlement, at least
until one or the other of the antagonists—Tito or Stalin
—
was dead or removed from power.
The first conclusion then had to be that Tito's
independent stand, a very real break from Russia, offered
many advantages to the West. Yet, Tito's precarious posi-
tion warranted caution and patience. As Robert Wolff said:
"To leap too fast to embrace Tito might be to destroy him
30
and the western opportunity together." The Department of
State must have constantly borne in mind that Tito's Yugo-
slavia was a communist state and was going to remain a
communist state; and, therefore, Tito would brook no
Western actions that smacked of attempted interference in
31internal affairs.
As such an attitude ruled out political action, what
significant advantage could the United States take of
Tito's isolation and the blow to Soviet prestige? What
should be America's objectives? The first objective, if
30Wolff, op_. cit .
,
p. 410.
31In late July, 1948, Tito told a visiting former
United States Governor that Yugoslavia would welcome a
trade agreement with the United States provided it did not
contain any political conditions. The New York Times , July
26, 1948, p. 5.

91
American interest was to benefit, had to be to aid Yugo-
slavia in maintaining her independence from Moscow, thus
assuring an excellent and long-lasting reminder to Eastern
Europe that the U.S.S.R. could be defied. The most effec-
tive method for this was through economic help. If the
United States could work in the long run successfully to
tie Yugoslavia to the world economy, Yugoslavia would be
stabilized as a member of the Western economic system.
Once this was accomplished, the planners certainly could
foresee that a strong, independent Yugoslavia would mirror
the possibilities of national independence to the satellite
nations. Even considering the stranglehold that Stalin had
on Eastern Europe, time and economic growth could surely
rekindle nationalistic thoughts in those countries.
Another and key consideration was the strategic sig-
nificance of Yugoslavia's newly-independent position. The
annunciation of the Truman Doctrine in the spring of 1947
had provoked violent words from Marshal Tito. He referred
to it as an obvious act of "American intervention." Accord-
ing to Tito, the American policy could not alter Yugo-
slavia's foreign policy in any way. Tito explained: "One
reason is the visible American intervention in the home
policy of these two countries [Greece and Turkey],
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32particularly in Greece." Now Yugoslavia was facing
economic disaster through isolation, for Stalin had con-
vinced the remaining Cominform members to break relations
with Yugoslavia. There also followed a great purge of the
communist ranks in these countries for the purpose of
eliminating "Titoism." Tito's first overture to the West,
and in particular to the United States, was to promise that
Yugoslavia would no longer aid the Greek guerrillas in
their battle against the U. S. -supported Greek Government.
Even considering that Yugoslavia could no longer afford to
support and harbor the guerrillas, this was a meaningful
concession to Tito's political doctrine.
Since the loss of Czechoslovakia into the Russian
sphere not too many months before, the main American con-
cern in Europe was the containment of the communist prog-
ress and commencement of a long-continuing effort against
Soviet imperialism in behalf of the independence of the
Eastern European states. Yugoslavia could become a key
factor in that overall European plan. With Yugoslavia's
independence came the lessening of pressure on France and
Italy, and more especially on Greece. But political cau-
tion was necessary. The Department of State planners had






to concede that any kind of political intrusion in Yugo-
slavia might upset the delicate balance caused by the split
and at the same time alienate Tito and strengthen Stalin.
Certainly, there was not going to be any internal
collapse in Yugoslavia if Tito's state could survive eco-
nomically. Tito's popularity and the exhilaration of
standing up to the Russian Bear served to unite the Yugo-
slav populace despite the predominance of anti-communist
feeling. Regardless of the fact that economic aid to
Yugoslavia would serve to strengthen Tito, that aid had to
be made available.
Two obstacles remained that the Department of State
had to consider: the touchy American domestic attitude
toward Tito and the Yugoslav Government; and the effects of
that attitude on congressional support for a new Yugoslav
policy—support that was necessary to supply the economic
assistance. The confrontations between Yugoslav and
American troops in Trieste, the trials of Mihailovic and
Archbishop Stepinac, the loss of American planes and lives
to Yugoslav fighter planes, and the diplomatic difficulties
caused by Yugoslavia were all fresh in the American public's
mind. Therefore, an expertly-planned presentation program
had to be developed to show Congress the immense importance
of a Yugoslavia independent of Russia. We know that the
Department of State's initial aid proposals received the
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support of Congress, but in view of the continuing hos-
tility of segments of the American public to Communist
Yugoslavia, even though independent, there remained a prob-
lem for the President and the Department of State during
the ensuing years to maintain continuing support in
Congress of aid programs for Yugoslavia.
The policies and programs developed by the Depart-
ment of State for supporting the independence of Yugoslavia
were based on realistic considerations of political interest.
The Department of State clearly recognized the splendid op-
portunity made available by Tito's break with Stalin and
the Cominform. Here was a chance to strike at Soviet im-
perialism in Europe and to begin the process of working in
an effective way though slowly—by helping to make Tito's
heresy of a national communist and independent state influ-
ential among the Eastern European countries of the bloc
—
for the ultimate independence of Eastern Europe. That
opportunity was not going to be missed.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: THE UNITED STATES BEGINS
AID TO YUGOSLAVIA
The position could be taken that both the communist
camp and the Western camp wanted and needed Yugoslavia. Of
all the Russian satellite nations at this time, Yugoslavia
was in the best possible position to assist any grandiose
expansion plans that Stalin might have harbored. Bordering
upon both Italy and Austria, and with easy access to France
through Italy, Yugoslavia offered the U.S.S.R. a spring-
board, if the proper moment came, to assist the large
Italian and French communist parties. From the speeches of
Yugoslavia's leaders, it was obvious that they all wanted
back into the communist fold. But they never wavered from
their demands to return on their own terms. They never
once offered to bargain with the Kremlin. Stalin could not
afford to give in to the Yugoslavs in any way, even for
strategic reasons.
This impasse was what had assured the West that
Yugoslavia would need assistance. Even though the British
were the first to complete a trade agreement with Yugo-
slavia, it was not reciprocal trade that Yugoslavia needed
most. The (,nly country in the world thai had wli.il Tito
really needed was the United States. That need was long
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term credit that could eventually be turned into an out-
right gift.
There is yet no way of knowing just when United
States officials informed Yugoslavia that aid might be
available if requested. Certainly, no definite promise
could have been made by the Department of State before the
matter was approved by the President's National Security
Council and the way paved in Congress. I suspect, though,
that within a short time following the break with the
Cominform Tito knew that the United States was most willing
to talk about economic assistance.
Tito, for his part, had to be careful of the way he
approached the West. Although he was assured the support
of the fellow communists in Yugoslavia against Stalin, he
did not know what the CPY's reaction would be to a possible
embrace of the American imperialists. This is probably why
Yugoslavia concluded her first trade agreement in the West
with Great Britain.
By the time the spring of 1949 arrived, Yugoslavia
was living on the brink of economic and political isola-
tion. Such an existence had so slowed the rate of develop-
ment that Yugoslavia was faced with possible reversion to a
chaos reminiscent of the recent war. The small trade
agreement with Great Britain was so minimal as to be no
help other than initiating the opening to the W< st. As it
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was obvious to the CPY that there was no chance of regain-
ing Soviet help, Tito turned to the United States and
requested that Yugoslavia be considered for economic as-
sistance. Aware of the doctrinal implications of such a
move, Tito blustered that he would allow no political con-
cessions to the Americans. The Department of State most
probably interpreted this as meant for consumption within
the CPY itself rather than a threat to the United States.
In Washington, Tito's request was given the full
treatment as a serious foreign policy decision. The prob-
lem was placed before the National Security Council for
appraisal and deliberation. As the Policy Planning Council
of the Department of State had already completed a position
paper on Yugoslavia, it is safe to assume that this paper
was used as the basis for the Security Council decision to
grant aid to Yugoslavia. Congressional leaders were neces-
sarily kept advised, and agreed on the importance of sup-
porting Yugoslavia's independence. All that remained was
explaining the decision to the American people and to
America's allies. The allies accepted the decision as part
of great power politics; but the American public has never
been convinced of the wisdom of such a decision. Neverthe-
less, U. S. economic aid to Yugoslavia began in late 1949.
The decision t< offer economi< issistance to a com-
munist country was so sharp a deviation from pa: I \mei Lean
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policy that its importance cannot be overemphasized. It
has influenced and been a model for American foreign policy
toward all the Eastern European countries. Poland was a
later recipient of benefits from this policy; and today
Rumania and any other Eastern European country showing
definite signs of seeking national independence is eligible.
Unfortunately, the Administration's attempts to encourage
such an independent status are frustrated by a Congress who
obviously does not grasp the great significance of such a
posture.
The aid to Yugoslavia has been termed extravagant by
some critics; but it certainly was never intended to be more
than just enough to establish the Yugoslav economy and help
maintain Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union.
The greatest criticism of the assistance to Yugo-
slavia has come from Congress. Although the two houses of
Congress provided enough foreign aid funds to keep the
Yugoslav policy alive, threats to cancel Yugoslavia's
"most favored nation" status have constantly bothered
Department of State officials. Since these critics are
supposed to be echoing the concern of their constituents,
the only conclusion is that the Department of State has not




The Yugoslav theoretician, Edvard Kardel j , expressed
the Yugoslav attitude toward American aid when he said:
Tugoslavia will therefore strive to maintain such
relations with the United States regardless of whether
she receives American aid or not. Such assistance has
been of great help to the Jugoslav people and they
value it highly; it has never been, however, nor will
it ever be, the main consideration governing cur coun-
try's relations with the United States.
^
This same attitude has prevailed among the various American
officials who have been responsible for the Yugoslav policy.
The policy itself has been marked with consistency regard-
less of Democratic or Republic administrations. And it has
constantly flowed beneath the surface in the volatile East-
West relations of the past twenty years.
Certainly, the United States recognized the pitfalls
of combating communist economic policies, and fully ex-
pected to exploit eventually the advantages that would
accrue in eroding the structural formation of Marxist eco-
nomic doctrine. The growth of closer contacts and the
increasingly free flow of ideas and people between Yugo-
slavia and the West have in themselves been worth the
efforts; and they stand as proof of the foresight of those
Department of State officials who were responsible for
developing what stands today as our most successful foreign
1
Edvard KardelJ , "Evolution Ln Jui via," i-'orr i gn
Aft- airs, Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (October. 1956).
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policy since the advance of communism. The only blot
against the pursuit of this policy has been the inability
of the Executive Department of the United States to con-
vince the American public of the inherent soundness of the
policy. It is regretful that such a brilliant plan that
contributed so much to the containment of communist ad-
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